Yuhua Wang (王裕华) is an Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Pennsylvania. His articles have appeared in the China Journal, the China Review, the China Quarterly, Communist and Post-Communist Studies, the Journal of Peking University (Beijing Daxue Xuebao), and Studies in Comparative International Development. He is a frequent commentator on political developments in China and has been featured in the New York Times, Reuters, and South China Morning Post, as well as on CNN and DR (the Danish Broadcasting Corporation).
Under what conditions would authoritarian rulers be interested in the rule of law? What type of rule of law exists in authoritarian regimes? How do authoritarian rulers promote the rule of law without threatening their grip on power? Tying the Autocrat's Hands answers these questions by examining legal reforms in China. Yuhua Wang develops a demand-side theory arguing that authoritarian rulers will respect the rule of law when they need the cooperation of organized interest groups that control valuable and mobile assets but are not politically connected. He also defines the rule of law that exists in authoritarian regimes as a partial form of the rule of law, in which judicial fairness is respected in the commercial realm but not in the political realm. Tying the Autocrat's Hands demonstrates that the rule of law is better enforced in regions with a large number of foreign investors but less so in regions heavily invested in by Chinese investors.
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法治的需求侧理论,外资企业由于无法政治寻租而要求更公平的市场环境,因此对法治需求高。政府因为需要经济发展而愿意在经济领域自缚手脚。作者理论功底和实证分析同样精彩,政治及其腐败对于法治的影响提现了既得利益者对于国家权力的攫取和贪恋。要说有何不足,作者可以更精细处理几次司改的命运,并更清晰地分析法治在政治经济领域的不均衡可能带来的危机。
评分每章开头引一句卡夫卡,玩得6
评分略失望,为何政治学还钟情现代化理论(作为靶子),因为inference的限制不能讲更精细的故事了吗?
评分加一星给卡夫卡 难得(也难看)的是作者作为一个北大背景的学者居然提供了这么一个头脑简单的答案
评分读完Introduction,可以转战该系列其他书了。
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