Tying the Autocrat's Hands pdf epub mobi txt 电子书 下载 2025
- 政治学
- 中国政治
- 海外中国研究
- 威权主义
- 法治
- 法学
- 比较政治
- 王玉华
- 政治制度
- 权力制衡
- 专制治理
- 制度设计
- 国家治理
- 政治改革
- 宪政主义
- 权力监督
- 政治哲学
- 公共政策
具体描述
Under what conditions would authoritarian rulers be interested in the rule of law? What type of rule of law exists in authoritarian regimes? How do authoritarian rulers promote the rule of law without threatening their grip on power? Tying the Autocrat's Hands answers these questions by examining legal reforms in China. Yuhua Wang develops a demand-side theory arguing that authoritarian rulers will respect the rule of law when they need the cooperation of organized interest groups that control valuable and mobile assets but are not politically connected. He also defines the rule of law that exists in authoritarian regimes as a partial form of the rule of law, in which judicial fairness is respected in the commercial realm but not in the political realm. Tying the Autocrat's Hands demonstrates that the rule of law is better enforced in regions with a large number of foreign investors but less so in regions heavily invested in by Chinese investors.
作者简介
Yuhua Wang (王裕华) is an Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Pennsylvania. His articles have appeared in the China Journal, the China Review, the China Quarterly, Communist and Post-Communist Studies, the Journal of Peking University (Beijing Daxue Xuebao), and Studies in Comparative International Development. He is a frequent commentator on political developments in China and has been featured in the New York Times, Reuters, and South China Morning Post, as well as on CNN and DR (the Danish Broadcasting Corporation).
目录信息
2. A demand-side theory of authoritarian rule of law
3. Authoritarian judiciary: how the party-state limits the rule of law
4. State-business relations in China
5. Who bribes?
6. When do authoritarian rulers build less-corrupt courts?
7. When do authoritarian rulers invest in courts?
8. Conclusion.
· · · · · · (收起)
读后感
评分
评分
评分
评分
用户评价
读完Introduction，可以转战该系列其他书了。
评分（沒有給星星，而不是0星）看的時候有點小失望，不過第二章還是有科普到我的，而且，做這方面的研究本來也是蠻不容易的，为此加一颗星。。。
评分未达到预期。单看标题便能知核心论点的关键——外资进入推动中国经济领域的法治，但政治体制决定了政府不会允许政治上的防治。观点似乎不新鲜，且对于法治的探讨不够深入。被看重的或许更多的是多方法和数据处理的擅长吧。
评分4.5星。和其他很多读者不同，我很喜欢这本书。第一，提出的问题很重要，有的威权国家为什么会有动力推动依法治国是一个很好的研究题目。作者的回答也有广泛的可应用性，其理论核心虽然简单但很有力。本书的核心论点是更依赖于FDI的地方政府更可能会推动法治，因为外资需要公正透明的法治来维护其投资利益。相反，当地的企业可以通过私人关系和腐败来维护自身利益。第二，数据分析虽然不见得尽善尽美，但我没发现什么大错，而且给定作者的数据，我不认为自己会做得比作者更好。第三，丰富的、有意思的一手访谈，里面有许多有趣的东西（比如有个“保护牌”的图），也足见作者真的是中国法治问题的专家。总起来看，本书算是我读过的最优秀（之一）的基于中国案例的比较政治学著作了。
评分读完Introduction，可以转战该系列其他书了。
相关图书
本站所有内容均为互联网搜索引擎提供的公开搜索信息，本站不存储任何数据与内容，任何内容与数据均与本站无关，如有需要请联系相关搜索引擎包括但不限于百度，google,bing,sogou 等
© 2025 book.quotespace.org All Rights Reserved. 小美书屋 版权所有