Tying the Autocrat's Hands pdf epub mobi txt 电子书 下载 2025
- 政治学
- 中国政治
- 海外中国研究
- 威权主义
- 法治
- 法学
- 比较政治
- 王玉华
- 政治制度
- 权力制衡
- 专制治理
- 制度设计
- 国家治理
- 政治改革
- 宪政主义
- 权力监督
- 政治哲学
- 公共政策
具体描述
Under what conditions would authoritarian rulers be interested in the rule of law? What type of rule of law exists in authoritarian regimes? How do authoritarian rulers promote the rule of law without threatening their grip on power? Tying the Autocrat's Hands answers these questions by examining legal reforms in China. Yuhua Wang develops a demand-side theory arguing that authoritarian rulers will respect the rule of law when they need the cooperation of organized interest groups that control valuable and mobile assets but are not politically connected. He also defines the rule of law that exists in authoritarian regimes as a partial form of the rule of law, in which judicial fairness is respected in the commercial realm but not in the political realm. Tying the Autocrat's Hands demonstrates that the rule of law is better enforced in regions with a large number of foreign investors but less so in regions heavily invested in by Chinese investors.
作者简介
Yuhua Wang (王裕华) is an Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Pennsylvania. His articles have appeared in the China Journal, the China Review, the China Quarterly, Communist and Post-Communist Studies, the Journal of Peking University (Beijing Daxue Xuebao), and Studies in Comparative International Development. He is a frequent commentator on political developments in China and has been featured in the New York Times, Reuters, and South China Morning Post, as well as on CNN and DR (the Danish Broadcasting Corporation).
目录信息
2. A demand-side theory of authoritarian rule of law
3. Authoritarian judiciary: how the party-state limits the rule of law
4. State-business relations in China
5. Who bribes?
6. When do authoritarian rulers build less-corrupt courts?
7. When do authoritarian rulers invest in courts?
8. Conclusion.
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读后感
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用户评价
一些结论：外资企业由于没有政治资本、受企业机制不会贿赂，普遍认为自身产权没有受到保护，转而寻求法治途径、走诉讼而非调解或仲裁。对比之下港澳台资本因有人际网络而无意推动法治，中国经济改革是外资vs中资而非公有vs私有。政府为FDI经济利益相应建设法制，但仅限于经济纠纷而非民事/政治纠纷。法院行政结构、经费来源、人员晋升直接说受控于政府，后者又看重经济发展和社会稳定，所以法庭直接成了维持绩效的工具。作者为了出书时常一段话在前中后反复说三五遍让我很困扰，而且这种以定量方法为主导的铁板一块的研究显然太无趣、结论太大一统了，让我怀疑定性访谈的其他自变量都不见了，每章开头引一段卡夫卡的城堡很文艺，不过总体而言我对法治需求侧理论不感兴趣，顺道八卦了他统计学家老婆Boyang Chai~ Chris
评分（沒有給星星，而不是0星）看的時候有點小失望，不過第二章還是有科普到我的，而且，做這方面的研究本來也是蠻不容易的，为此加一颗星。。。
评分读完Introduction，可以转战该系列其他书了。
评分略失望，为何政治学还钟情现代化理论（作为靶子），因为inference的限制不能讲更精细的故事了吗？
评分读完Introduction，可以转战该系列其他书了。
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