About the Author
Bruce Bueno de Mesquita is the Julius Silver Professor of Politics and director of the Alexander Hamilton Center for Political Economy at New York University. He is the author of 16 books, including The Predictioneer’s Game.Alastair Smith is professor of politics at New York University. The recipient of three grants from the National Science Foundation and author of three books, he was chosen as the 2005 Karl Deutsch Award winner, given biennially to the best international relations scholar under the age of 40.
In this title, two renowned political scientists make the contrarian, research-based case that - regardless of any other factors political scientists or historians may find relevant - the calculations and actions of rulers are the driving force of all politics, and the primary goal of rulers is to maintain power as long as possible. In this clever and accessible book, Bueno de Mesquita and Smith introduce us to their perspective of the political world. They bare the logic of politics, starting from the simple premise that leaders pursue their own ends, and that populations either have, or more often don't have, the power to constrain them to a significant degree. The book is organized by a series interconnected questions, among them: Why do leaders who wreck their countries keep their jobs for so long? Why do autocracies have dismal economic policies? How are there so many suffering people in resource-rich lands? Why do 'natural disasters' disproportionately strike poor nations? Why do 'evil-doers' so often collect loads of foreign aid? Why are democracies so good at war? In answering these questions, the authors look at politics, the choices of public policies, and even decisions about war and peace as lying outside of conventional thinking about culture and history. They set aside ideas of civic virtue and psychopathology. Such notions simply are not central to understanding what leaders do and why they do it. Instead, Bueno de Mesquita and Smith see politicians as self-interested louts, just the sort of people you wouldn't want to have over for dinner, but without whom you might not have dinner at all. And from this perspective, they are able to answer some perplexing mysteries of politics, shed light on what we read in the newspapers every single day, and offer realistic ways of improving human governance.
很有趣的一本书 看完有一段时间了 也没做全书总结但仍印象深刻 据说中文版删改很多 回头看英文版吧 书里阐述了很多关于民主和独裁体制的关键特点等等 码了一大堆字,豆瓣告诉我涉及敏感内容不能发表。。。 总之...
评分年初在zaker上看到对本书的书评,看完书评以后就有看原著的强烈兴趣了。 作者在这本书里把对政治长达近20年的研究变成了普通老百姓都能看懂的通俗文字。 本书对于理解各国政府的行为有极大帮助,包括导致某搜索网站最终404的事件。本书对于统治的基本规则,不同执政者如何掌权...
评分刘瑜女士将本书暗示为“民主颂”,完全同意。但她直接把最后一章“怎么办”的内容忽略了。我摘几段,大家就明白为什么了:(这里的“我们”指美国)“当某个外国的人民普遍反对我们的根本利益,我们获得想要的东西的最好办法就是让该国人民处于按美国人民意愿办事的独裁者的高...
评分刘瑜女士将本书暗示为“民主颂”,完全同意。但她直接把最后一章“怎么办”的内容忽略了。我摘几段,大家就明白为什么了:(这里的“我们”指美国)“当某个外国的人民普遍反对我们的根本利益,我们获得想要的东西的最好办法就是让该国人民处于按美国人民意愿办事的独裁者的高...
评分政治学学术论著,无权谋厚黑阴谋论。show you why, not how ... 核心观点: 没有真正的独裁,任何领袖都需要盟友。 盟友的范围包括:名义选民、影响者、致胜联盟,而且三者比例决定政体。 掌权的精髓: 1.缩小致胜联盟 ; 2.扩大名义选民; 3.知道钱在哪; 4.给致胜联盟足够的...
书评已发:《放诸古今皆准的权力规则》
评分获取控制权并保持住,政治的首要目的。抓住少数关键人物的支持并使得这些支持者处于忠诚,需要高超的手段控制实际结盟者的数目,人数小到随时可以替换,大数到可以完全控制。而名义结盟者,越多越好。政治是少数人的游戏,这个游戏的风险和收益巨大,而博弈的结果并不会一定导向经济效率高的均衡或是居民普惠的政策。政治人物首先迎合的便是结盟者,而居民始终是最后一位,尽管名义上是第一位。善治依赖于大的权力联盟,即长官不能通过赢取少数人的支持保持领导位置。
评分《傲娇小独裁养成手册》 (于是我上了这课的最大感受就是卡扎菲年轻时很萌……么)
评分脑洞太大,有点儿牵强。不过有些部分(比如援助问题)听起来挺有道理的。 分好高啊。
评分I think selectorate theory is an extention of realism school instead of a stand-alone theory. Overall an exciting theory with somewhat funky examples.
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