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Robert Gibbons

Sloan Distinguished Professor of Organizational Economics and Strategy

Sloan School and Department of Economics

出版者:Princeton University Press

作者:Robert Gibbons

出品人:

页数:288

译者:

出版时间:1992-7-13

价格:USD 49.50

装帧:Paperback

isbn号码:9780691003955

丛书系列:

图书标签:

博弈论
经济学
GameTheory
economics
教材
经济
数学
美国

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This book introduces one of the most powerful tools of modern economics to a wide audience: those who will later construct or consume game-theoretic models. Robert Gibbons addresses scholars in applied fields within economics who want a serious and thorough discussion of game theory but who may have found other works overly abstract. Gibbons emphasizes the economic applications of the theory at least as much as the pure theory itself; formal arguments about abstract games play a minor role. The applications illustrate the process of model building--of translating an informal description of a multi-person decision situation into a formal game-theoretic problem to be analyzed. Also, the variety of applications shows that similar issues arise in different areas of economics, and that the same game-theoretic tools can be applied in each setting. In order to emphasize the broad potential scope of the theory, conventional applications from industrial organization have been largely replaced by applications from labor, macro, and other applied fields in economics. The book covers four classes of games, and four corresponding notions of equilibrium: static games of complete information and Nash equilibrium, dynamic games of complete information and subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium, static games of incomplete information and Bayesian Nash equilibrium, and dynamic games of incomplete information and perfect Bayesian equilibrium.

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全书内容很简单，只需要简单的概率论即可。博弈论的介绍很不全面，只介绍了static/dynamic case with complete/incomplete information，对于很多经典的内容都没有涉及，比如knowlodge等等，仅仅适合初学者。初学的时候也许有的价值，但要深入研究博弈论的话，这本书不值得...

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作为Game Theory基本内容的经典入门书籍，值得推荐。本书侧重应用，没有讨论太多的理论问题，也没有很严格的证明，但是应用的例子很多，课后的习题很多也是从实际的论文改编的。在讲例子的时候，都是大段大段的说明，条件、问题、过程、结论都不像是在讲题，可能是数学书看多...

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