The Politics of Authoritarian Rule pdf epub mobi txt 電子書下載2025

簡體網頁||繁體網頁

☆☆☆☆☆

出版者:Cambridge University Press

作者:Milan W. Svolik

出品人:

頁數:288 pages

译者:

出版時間:2012-9-17

價格:USD 98.00

裝幀:Hardcover

isbn號碼:9781107024793

叢書系列:Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics

圖書標籤:

政治學
威權主義
比較政治
政治
獨裁政治
民主轉型
英文原版
比較政治學
政治學
威權主義
權力結構
國傢理論
政治體製
專製統治
政府形式
政治權力
製度分析
政治行為

下載連結在頁面底部

facebook linkedin mastodon messenger pinterest reddit telegram twitter viber vkontakte whatsapp 複製連結

想要找書就要到小美書屋

book.quotespace.org

立刻按 ctrl+D收藏本頁

你會得到大驚喜!!

具體描述

What drives politics in dictatorships? Milan W. Svolik argues authoritarian regimes must resolve two fundamental conflicts. Dictators face threats from the masses over which they rule – the problem of authoritarian control. Secondly from the elites with whom dictators rule – the problem of authoritarian power-sharing. Using the tools of game theory, Svolik explains why some dictators establish personal autocracy and stay in power for decades; why elsewhere leadership changes are regular and institutionalized, as in contemporary China; why some dictatorships are ruled by soldiers, as Uganda was under Idi Amin; why many authoritarian regimes, such as PRI-era Mexico, maintain regime-sanctioned political parties; and why a country's authoritarian past casts a long shadow over its prospects for democracy, as the unfolding events of the Arab Spring reveal. Svolik complements these and other historical case studies with the statistical analysis on institutions, leaders and ruling coalitions across dictatorships from 1946 to 2008.

著者簡介

圖書目錄

1. Introduction: the anatomy of dictatorship; 2. The world of authoritarian politics; Part I. The Problem of Authoritarian Power-Sharing: 3. And then there was one!: Authoritarian power-sharing and the path to personal dictatorship; 4. Institutions, collective action, and the success of authoritarian power-sharing; Part II. The Problem of Authoritarian Control: 5. Moral hazard in authoritarian repression and the origins of military dictatorships; 6. Why authoritarian parties?: The regime party as an instrument of co-optation and control; 7. Conclusion: incentives and institutions in authoritarian politics.
· · · · · · (收起)

讀後感

評分☆☆☆☆☆

用戶評價

评分☆☆☆☆☆

Svolik值得期待必成大器

评分☆☆☆☆☆

當領導人和盟友的權力分布相對平衡時，盟友可以做齣有效懲罰（替換）領導人的可信威脅，從而阻止個人專權，維持權力分享。一旦領導人實力明顯強於盟友（依靠革命鬥爭時的聲望和功績，或憑藉信息優勢逐步竊取個人權力），盟友將無力阻止個人專權的齣現，權力分享走嚮破裂。由於強大到足以消滅任何盟友，個人專權局麵幾乎不可能由內部打破，而隻能是外部入侵、民眾起義或領導人的自然死亡。

评分☆☆☆☆☆

把dictator麵對的問題分成authoritarian power sharing 和authoritarian control。power sharing這部分做的比control那部分好；formal model部分比empirical做的好

评分☆☆☆☆☆

2015

评分☆☆☆☆☆

子類型有點劃分得太細瞭