What drives politics in dictatorships? Milan W. Svolik argues authoritarian regimes must resolve two fundamental conflicts. Dictators face threats from the masses over which they rule – the problem of authoritarian control. Secondly from the elites with whom dictators rule – the problem of authoritarian power-sharing. Using the tools of game theory, Svolik explains why some dictators establish personal autocracy and stay in power for decades; why elsewhere leadership changes are regular and institutionalized, as in contemporary China; why some dictatorships are ruled by soldiers, as Uganda was under Idi Amin; why many authoritarian regimes, such as PRI-era Mexico, maintain regime-sanctioned political parties; and why a country's authoritarian past casts a long shadow over its prospects for democracy, as the unfolding events of the Arab Spring reveal. Svolik complements these and other historical case studies with the statistical analysis on institutions, leaders and ruling coalitions across dictatorships from 1946 to 2008.
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Large-N statistical studies, game theory, case study...BSF his methodological mind working, nevertheless SUPERB!
评分2015
评分把dictator面对的问题分成authoritarian power sharing 和authoritarian control。power sharing这部分做的比control那部分好;formal model部分比empirical做的好
评分Svolik值得期待必成大器
评分抛开形式模型不说,至少是超越了Geddes的,最科学完整的威权分类。
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