This 2006 book provides a theory of the logic of survival of the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), one of the most resilient autocratic regimes in the twentieth century. An autocratic regime hid behind the facade of elections that were held with clockwise precision. Although their outcome was totally predictable, elections were not hollow rituals. The PRI made millions of ordinary citizens vest their interests in the survival of the autocratic regime. Voters could not simply 'throw the rascals out of office' because their choices were constrained by a series of strategic dilemmas that compelled them to support the autocrats. The book also explores the factors that led to the demise of the PRI. The theory sheds light on the logic of 'electoral autocracies', among the most common type of autocracy, and is the only systematic treatment in the literature today dealing with this form of autocracy.
Beatriz Magaloni is Assistant Professor of Political Science at Stanford University.
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我感觉其实关于punishment regime 的部分可以拓展一下。作者似乎认为对反对派赢得选举的市政进行财政歧视是“惩罚”叛变的选民,我倒觉得其实是一个credit claiming的问题:中央的福利项目在反对派赢得选举的城市很容易被当权的反对派宣传成是自己的功绩。
评分Among the many recent important attempts in opening the black box of authoritarianism, stands out by rationalizing the seemly irrational.
评分关于一党独大制的经典研究。威权国家的选举。
评分日本 墨西哥 土耳其
评分看了Introduction,理论贡献著作,需要回看。主要回答为什么PRI能够常年在选举中获胜的问题。
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