Voting for Autocracy pdf epub mobi txt 电子书下载 2025

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出版者:Cambridge University Press

作者:Beatriz Magaloni

出品人:

页数:316

译者:

出版时间:2008-08-11

价格:USD 24.99

装帧:Paperback

isbn号码:9780521736596

丛书系列:Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics

图书标签:

比较政治
政治学
拉美研究
比较威权
威权韧性
威权主义
民主转型
民主化
政治体制
民主衰退
选举政治
威权主义
公民权利
权力集中
政治参与
社会分裂
媒体影响
制度信任

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具体描述

This 2006 book provides a theory of the logic of survival of the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), one of the most resilient autocratic regimes in the twentieth century. An autocratic regime hid behind the facade of elections that were held with clockwise precision. Although their outcome was totally predictable, elections were not hollow rituals. The PRI made millions of ordinary citizens vest their interests in the survival of the autocratic regime. Voters could not simply 'throw the rascals out of office' because their choices were constrained by a series of strategic dilemmas that compelled them to support the autocrats. The book also explores the factors that led to the demise of the PRI. The theory sheds light on the logic of 'electoral autocracies', among the most common type of autocracy, and is the only systematic treatment in the literature today dealing with this form of autocracy.

作者简介

Beatriz Magaloni is Assistant Professor of Political Science at Stanford University.

目录信息

1. Equilibrium party hegemony;
2. Structural determinants of mass support;
3. Budget cycles under autocracy;
4. The politics of vote-buying;
5. Judging economic performance in hard times;
6. Ideological divisions in the opposition camp;
7. How voters choose and mass coordination dilemmas;
8. Electoral fraud and the game of electoral transitions;
9. Conclusion.
· · · · · · (收起)

读后感

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典范性的开篇和结尾，问题的提出，竞争解释的综述以及案例的可推广性辩护值得学习。用墨西哥PRI的例子说明一个霸权式单一政党体系如何利用选举制造了一个market of loyaty,将选民的利益编制在这一看似民主的选举之中。从博弈论的角度在动机层面解读了精英和穷人面对这样的一个选举现实的选择。ｉｄｅｏｌｏｇｉｃａｌ　ｉｎｖｅｓｔｍｅｎｔｓ是个很有趣的概念。个案分析是比多个ｃａｓｅ的比较要详实许多。比较政治的研究虽然大气但分析方式真的不是我的菜啊。。。

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highly sophisticated analysis

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看了Introduction，理论贡献著作，需要回看。主要回答为什么PRI能够常年在选举中获胜的问题。

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感觉作者提供了一种颇为微妙的解释方式。做hegemonic party system的人会向做Dominant party system的取经，反之亦然。墨西哥政治的研究者竭力试图说服读者，墨西哥其实很像意大利和日本，执政党都是在选举中获胜。而日本和意大利政治的研究者则竭力劝说读者，意大利和日本很像拉美，天民党和自民党都靠pork politics过活。如果不看作者讨论的对象，开始还以为此书说的是自民党的故事。派阀和利益诱导政治。不过从日本的故事来看，讽刺地是，大概至少还是“纯”民主制更加有助于优位政党长期执政。毕竟倘若没有自民党的分裂，在野党93年之前都没有夺取政权的欲念。而93年之后他们有了这种欲念之后，经济无论好坏，自民党的席位不见得比93年之前更少。哪种讲故事的方式更有意思呢？

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日本墨西哥土耳其