圖書標籤: 經濟學 製度 經濟,政治和曆史 教材 政治學 pdf epub Dixit
发表于2024-12-23
Lawlessness and Economics pdf epub mobi txt 電子書 下載 2024
How can property rights be protected and contracts be enforced in countries where the rule of law is ineffective or absent? How can firms from advanced market economies do business in such circumstances? In Lawlessness and Economics , Avinash Dixit examines the theory of private institutions that transcend or supplement weak economic governance from the state. In much of the world and through much of history, private mechanisms--such as long-term relationships, arbitration, social networks to disseminate information and norms to impose sanctions, and for-profit enforcement services--have grown up in place of formal, state-governed institutions. Even in countries with strong legal systems, many of these mechanisms continue under the shadow of the law. Numerous case studies and empirical investigations have demonstrated the variety, importance, and merits, and drawbacks of such institutions. This book builds on these studies and constructs a toolkit of theoretical models to analyze them. The models shed new conceptual light on the different modes of governance, and deepen our understanding of the interaction of the alternative institutions with each other and with the government's law. For example, one model explains the limit on the size of social networks and illuminates problems in the transition to more formal legal systems as economies grow beyond this limit. Other models explain why for-profit enforcement is inefficient. The models also help us understand why state law dovetails with some non-state institutions and collides with others. This can help less-developed countries and transition economies devise better processes for the introduction or reform of their formal legal systems.
Avinash Kamalakar Dixit (born 1944) is an Indian-American economist originally of Indian nationality.
Dixit received a B.Sc. from Bombay University in 1963 in Mathematics and Physics, a B.A. from Cambridge University in 1965 in Mathematics (Corpus Christi College, First Class), and a Ph.D. in 1968 from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in Economics.
As of 2011, Dixit is the John J. F. Sherrerd '52 University Professor of Economics at Princeton University, and has been since July 1989. He was previously a professor of Economics and International Affairs. He previously taught at Massachusetts Institute of Technology, at the University of California, Berkeley, at Balliol College at Oxford University as the Lord Thomson of Fleet Fellow and Lecturer in Economics, and at the University of Warwick.
Avinash Dixit has also held visiting scholar positions at MIT as well as the International Monetary Fund and the Russell Sage Foundation.
He was President of the Econometric Society in 2001, and was Vice-President (2002) and President (2008) of the American Economic Association. He was elected to the American Academy of Arts and Sciences in 1992 and the National Academy of Sciences in 2005.
數理經濟模型較多,不能讀透,無法評論好壞。大緻觀點是當代製度經濟學、法律經濟學和增長研究等經濟領域,皆假設有一定政府公權力與法律保障。提齣“無法無天經濟學”(巧譯?)的概念,考察在崩壞/完全不存在高於經濟行為體的政府公權力和法律約束的情況下,單靠關係為基礎的關係社會和私人約束可否存續,提齣瞭製度起源的研究議程。大緻結論是在較原初較簡單(博弈者少、經濟活動少、交易物品不多、信息對經濟活動作用不太大)的環境中,以非法律非仲裁為基礎的關係社會尚能維持一定的效用,在復雜製度下私人創新也有一定活力,但當規模經濟未夠正當化公權力的創立,而交易、信息、博弈結構卻又超齣關係社會能維持的範圍,則經濟可能停滯不前,此時若過分強調自上而下照搬西方産權製度也可能過快地消解關係社會而又建不成較好製度。
評分數理經濟模型較多,不能讀透,無法評論好壞。大緻觀點是當代製度經濟學、法律經濟學和增長研究等經濟領域,皆假設有一定政府公權力與法律保障。提齣“無法無天經濟學”(巧譯?)的概念,考察在崩壞/完全不存在高於經濟行為體的政府公權力和法律約束的情況下,單靠關係為基礎的關係社會和私人約束可否存續,提齣瞭製度起源的研究議程。大緻結論是在較原初較簡單(博弈者少、經濟活動少、交易物品不多、信息對經濟活動作用不太大)的環境中,以非法律非仲裁為基礎的關係社會尚能維持一定的效用,在復雜製度下私人創新也有一定活力,但當規模經濟未夠正當化公權力的創立,而交易、信息、博弈結構卻又超齣關係社會能維持的範圍,則經濟可能停滯不前,此時若過分強調自上而下照搬西方産權製度也可能過快地消解關係社會而又建不成較好製度。
評分數理經濟模型較多,不能讀透,無法評論好壞。大緻觀點是當代製度經濟學、法律經濟學和增長研究等經濟領域,皆假設有一定政府公權力與法律保障。提齣“無法無天經濟學”(巧譯?)的概念,考察在崩壞/完全不存在高於經濟行為體的政府公權力和法律約束的情況下,單靠關係為基礎的關係社會和私人約束可否存續,提齣瞭製度起源的研究議程。大緻結論是在較原初較簡單(博弈者少、經濟活動少、交易物品不多、信息對經濟活動作用不太大)的環境中,以非法律非仲裁為基礎的關係社會尚能維持一定的效用,在復雜製度下私人創新也有一定活力,但當規模經濟未夠正當化公權力的創立,而交易、信息、博弈結構卻又超齣關係社會能維持的範圍,則經濟可能停滯不前,此時若過分強調自上而下照搬西方産權製度也可能過快地消解關係社會而又建不成較好製度。
評分數理經濟模型較多,不能讀透,無法評論好壞。大緻觀點是當代製度經濟學、法律經濟學和增長研究等經濟領域,皆假設有一定政府公權力與法律保障。提齣“無法無天經濟學”(巧譯?)的概念,考察在崩壞/完全不存在高於經濟行為體的政府公權力和法律約束的情況下,單靠關係為基礎的關係社會和私人約束可否存續,提齣瞭製度起源的研究議程。大緻結論是在較原初較簡單(博弈者少、經濟活動少、交易物品不多、信息對經濟活動作用不太大)的環境中,以非法律非仲裁為基礎的關係社會尚能維持一定的效用,在復雜製度下私人創新也有一定活力,但當規模經濟未夠正當化公權力的創立,而交易、信息、博弈結構卻又超齣關係社會能維持的範圍,則經濟可能停滯不前,此時若過分強調自上而下照搬西方産權製度也可能過快地消解關係社會而又建不成較好製度。
評分數理經濟模型較多,不能讀透,無法評論好壞。大緻觀點是當代製度經濟學、法律經濟學和增長研究等經濟領域,皆假設有一定政府公權力與法律保障。提齣“無法無天經濟學”(巧譯?)的概念,考察在崩壞/完全不存在高於經濟行為體的政府公權力和法律約束的情況下,單靠關係為基礎的關係社會和私人約束可否存續,提齣瞭製度起源的研究議程。大緻結論是在較原初較簡單(博弈者少、經濟活動少、交易物品不多、信息對經濟活動作用不太大)的環境中,以非法律非仲裁為基礎的關係社會尚能維持一定的效用,在復雜製度下私人創新也有一定活力,但當規模經濟未夠正當化公權力的創立,而交易、信息、博弈結構卻又超齣關係社會能維持的範圍,則經濟可能停滯不前,此時若過分強調自上而下照搬西方産權製度也可能過快地消解關係社會而又建不成較好製度。
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Lawlessness and Economics pdf epub mobi txt 電子書 下載 2024