Elinor Ostrom (née Awan; born August 7, 1933) is an American political economist.[2] She was awarded the 2009 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences, which she shared with Oliver E. Williamson, for "her analysis of economic governance, especially the commons."[3] She was the first, and to date, the only woman to win the prize in this category. Her work is associated with the new institutional economics and the resurgence of political economy.[4]
Ostrom lives in Bloomington, IN, and is on the faculty of both Indiana University and Arizona State University. She holds a Distinguished Professor at Indiana University and is the Arthur F. Bentley Professor of Political Science and Co-Director of the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis at Indiana University in Bloomington, as well as Research Professor and the Founding Director of the Center for the Study of Institutional Diversity at Arizona State University in Tempe. Ostrom also serves as a lead researcher for the Sustainable Agriculture and Natural Resource Management Collaborative Research Support Program (SANREM CRSP), managed by Virginia Tech and funded by USAID.[5]
The governance of natural resources used by many individuals in common is an issue of increasing concern to policy analysts. Both state control and privatisation of resources have been advocated, but neither the state nor the market have been uniformly successful in solving common pool resource problems. Offering a critique of the foundations of policy analysis as applied to natural resources, Elinor Ostrom here provides a unique body of empirical data to explore conditions under which common pool resource problems have been satisfactorily or unsatisfactorily solved. Dr Ostrom first describes three models most frequently used as the foundation for recommending state or market solutions. She then outlines theoretical and empirical alternatives to these models in order to illustrate the diversity of possible solutions. In the following chapters she uses institutional analysis to examine different ways - both successful and unsuccessful - of governing the commons. In contrast to the proposition of the tragedy of the commons argument, common pool problems sometimes are solved by voluntary organisations rather than by a coercive state. Among the cases considered are communal tenure in meadows and forests, irrigation communities and other water rights, and fisheries.
最近想结合自己的行业写点东西,但读的书少,读政治经济学得东西更少。来这里向各位书友请教。先向各位道声谢谢! 产品的供给,一种模式是政府严格管理,提高标准,人为造成产品高端化,从而导致产品供给的不足,同时政府需要承担不达标产品的监督与检查及欺骗行为。如目前国...
評分 評分由于学识尚浅,没有很高深的评论。 不知道是不是因为作者是女性的缘故,我认为她的分析是非常有“人情味儿”的。现在许多理论是机械式的,将人们当做有固定程式的机器人来进行分析的,而且常常令人感到冷漠和绝望——比如众所周知的理性经济人假设。而作者认为...
評分经济运行的基本模型即市场机制,市场作为“看不见的手”,以价格为信号引导着人们追求自我利益最大化,而很多时候,也“无心插柳”地促进了社会的公共利益。但是,面对垄断、外部性、信息不完全和公共物品领域等,市场存在着失灵的现象,这时便需要引入政府管制对模型进...
製度主義還是最喜歡North啊。可能是因為小型公共社區閤作在中國缺乏傳統吧,但寫的非常好,經典。
评分不分主次囉嗦至極!!!!
评分It begins with scenarios and numbers, and needs a lot of logic, so definitely not for bed reading. I gave up after about ten pages.
评分因為經典,所以近於常識;語言平順,邏輯清晰。
评分譚老師退休,想起來奧斯特羅姆夫婦,想起來我開政治學係還留存什麼遺産,想起來我始終不是學政治科學的料,譚老師及之後Wilson所帶給我的那些絲微的興趣,也許隻是斯德哥爾摩。
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