Governing the Commons

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Elinor Ostrom (née Awan; born August 7, 1933) is an American political economist.[2] She was awarded the 2009 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences, which she shared with Oliver E. Williamson, for "her analysis of economic governance, especially the commons."[3] She was the first, and to date, the only woman to win the prize in this category. Her work is associated with the new institutional economics and the resurgence of political economy.[4]

Ostrom lives in Bloomington, IN, and is on the faculty of both Indiana University and Arizona State University. She holds a Distinguished Professor at Indiana University and is the Arthur F. Bentley Professor of Political Science and Co-Director of the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis at Indiana University in Bloomington, as well as Research Professor and the Founding Director of the Center for the Study of Institutional Diversity at Arizona State University in Tempe. Ostrom also serves as a lead researcher for the Sustainable Agriculture and Natural Resource Management Collaborative Research Support Program (SANREM CRSP), managed by Virginia Tech and funded by USAID.[5]

出版者:Cambridge University Press
作者:Elinor Ostrom
出品人:
页数:298
译者:
出版时间:1990-11-30
价格:USD 29.00
装帧:Paperback
isbn号码:9780521405997
丛书系列:
图书标签:
  • 经济学 
  • 制度 
  • 公共产权 
  • 政治学 
  • 美国 
  • PoliticalEconomy 
  • economics 
  • Political-Science 
  •  
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The governance of natural resources used by many individuals in common is an issue of increasing concern to policy analysts. Both state control and privatisation of resources have been advocated, but neither the state nor the market have been uniformly successful in solving common pool resource problems. Offering a critique of the foundations of policy analysis as applied to natural resources, Elinor Ostrom here provides a unique body of empirical data to explore conditions under which common pool resource problems have been satisfactorily or unsatisfactorily solved. Dr Ostrom first describes three models most frequently used as the foundation for recommending state or market solutions. She then outlines theoretical and empirical alternatives to these models in order to illustrate the diversity of possible solutions. In the following chapters she uses institutional analysis to examine different ways - both successful and unsuccessful - of governing the commons. In contrast to the proposition of the tragedy of the commons argument, common pool problems sometimes are solved by voluntary organisations rather than by a coercive state. Among the cases considered are communal tenure in meadows and forests, irrigation communities and other water rights, and fisheries.

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读后感

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正如上贴所言,为何无人识,确实非常奇怪的,国内学者好像很少引用这本书,研究新制度经济学的,对这本书好像推荐不多?自己还是上西方财政学时,老师在讲公共品时,对这本书有初步的介绍。作者研究的是社区合作,而这不在政府与市场之内,也许这就是被经济学家们忽略的...  

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奥斯特罗姆通过大量的事例,向我们介绍关于公共事务治理方法,并进行后续分析。由三个理论引出本书的内容分析,包括哈丁的“公地灾难”、“囚犯难题”及奥尔森的“集体行动的逻辑”。这些理论模型都说明,个人的理性行动最终导致的却是集体无理性的结果。 对此,以往认为的解...  

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本書的作者是公共經濟學與公共選擇學派的創始人之一,埃莉諾・奧斯特羅姆(Elinor Ostrom)。副標題叫做“集體行動制度的演進”.在我看來,其副標題,簡明扼要點出全書的核心。 開頭要說一說關於翻譯的事情,我不確定原書當中如何遣詞造句,但此書翻譯的水準讓我來說到底有...  

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奥斯特罗姆通过大量的事例,向我们介绍关于公共事务治理方法,并进行后续分析。由三个理论引出本书的内容分析,包括哈丁的“公地灾难”、“囚犯难题”及奥尔森的“集体行动的逻辑”。这些理论模型都说明,个人的理性行动最终导致的却是集体无理性的结果。 对此,以往认为的解...  

用户评价

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还要看其它书,只能匆匆一阅。奥女士的思路同前辈名家截然不同:奥尔森、哈丁醉心于提出简洁的、解释力涵盖各种组织和情境的模型,奥女士反对如此过分简化的做法,提倡找出具体情境中影响公用品制度和决策的变量,再以机制加以串联,成为分析框架,用以分析不同的个案积聚成理论;奥尔森、萨缪尔森将公共品和私人物品截然分开,奥女士则指出公用资源在个人攫取机制上形同私人物品,在提供和维持机制上又近似于公共品,两个冲突的机制在不同的策略互动中碰撞,这一进路解决了奥尔森留下的“选择性激励”到底如何界定的问题;前代理论假定博弈结构的外在限制恒定,国家市场等机制皆有过分简化的定义,故解决方法不是外来权力就是产权安排,奥女士则着重考察小型社区情境中个人如何在互动中设定和改变博弈规则、分配公用资源,提出社区产权的第三条路。

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经典论著

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看过较久,有些内容记不清了。大体记得是从“公用地悲剧”和博弈论出发解读collective action的一本书,中间列举丰富例证证明信息互动、共享价值观、外在监督的作用。最后的结论把作者的观点梳理得很清晰。作者自己是很有名的instistutionalism研究者,这本书写得也很透彻易懂(至少比起D.C.North是这样,斜眼)。

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还要看其它书,只能匆匆一阅。奥女士的思路同前辈名家截然不同:奥尔森、哈丁醉心于提出简洁的、解释力涵盖各种组织和情境的模型,奥女士反对如此过分简化的做法,提倡找出具体情境中影响公用品制度和决策的变量,再以机制加以串联,成为分析框架,用以分析不同的个案积聚成理论;奥尔森、萨缪尔森将公共品和私人物品截然分开,奥女士则指出公用资源在个人攫取机制上形同私人物品,在提供和维持机制上又近似于公共品,两个冲突的机制在不同的策略互动中碰撞,这一进路解决了奥尔森留下的“选择性激励”到底如何界定的问题;前代理论假定博弈结构的外在限制恒定,国家市场等机制皆有过分简化的定义,故解决方法不是外来权力就是产权安排,奥女士则着重考察小型社区情境中个人如何在互动中设定和改变博弈规则、分配公用资源,提出社区产权的第三条路。

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谭老师退休,想起来奥斯特罗姆夫妇,想起来我开政治学系还留存什么遗产,想起来我始终不是学政治科学的料,谭老师及之后Wilson所带给我的那些丝微的兴趣,也许只是斯德哥尔摩。

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