Governing the Commons pdf epub mobi txt 电子书 下载 2025
Elinor Ostrom (née Awan; born August 7, 1933) is an American political economist.[2] She was awarded the 2009 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences, which she shared with Oliver E. Williamson, for "her analysis of economic governance, especially the commons."[3] She was the first, and to date, the only woman to win the prize in this category. Her work is associated with the new institutional economics and the resurgence of political economy.[4]
Ostrom lives in Bloomington, IN, and is on the faculty of both Indiana University and Arizona State University. She holds a Distinguished Professor at Indiana University and is the Arthur F. Bentley Professor of Political Science and Co-Director of the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis at Indiana University in Bloomington, as well as Research Professor and the Founding Director of the Center for the Study of Institutional Diversity at Arizona State University in Tempe. Ostrom also serves as a lead researcher for the Sustainable Agriculture and Natural Resource Management Collaborative Research Support Program (SANREM CRSP), managed by Virginia Tech and funded by USAID.[5]
- 经济学
- 制度
- 公共产权
- 政治学
- 美国
- PoliticalEconomy
- economics
- Political-Science
The governance of natural resources used by many individuals in common is an issue of increasing concern to policy analysts. Both state control and privatisation of resources have been advocated, but neither the state nor the market have been uniformly successful in solving common pool resource problems. Offering a critique of the foundations of policy analysis as applied to natural resources, Elinor Ostrom here provides a unique body of empirical data to explore conditions under which common pool resource problems have been satisfactorily or unsatisfactorily solved. Dr Ostrom first describes three models most frequently used as the foundation for recommending state or market solutions. She then outlines theoretical and empirical alternatives to these models in order to illustrate the diversity of possible solutions. In the following chapters she uses institutional analysis to examine different ways - both successful and unsuccessful - of governing the commons. In contrast to the proposition of the tragedy of the commons argument, common pool problems sometimes are solved by voluntary organisations rather than by a coercive state. Among the cases considered are communal tenure in meadows and forests, irrigation communities and other water rights, and fisheries.
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读后感
首先承认这个标题确实有“姨学”的感觉，因为刘数卷阿姨经常把这句话挂在嘴边（无非就是指他们远邪党是中国未来的种子云云）。但是这句诗文本来就不是他的专利，他能用，我也能用。 这本书着实令我喜出望外------对山泽林薮这样的重要资源，到底是应该由国家进行管控还是应该由...
评分 评分最近想结合自己的行业写点东西，但读的书少，读政治经济学得东西更少。来这里向各位书友请教。先向各位道声谢谢！ 产品的供给，一种模式是政府严格管理，提高标准，人为造成产品高端化，从而导致产品供给的不足，同时政府需要承担不达标产品的监督与检查及欺骗行为。如目前国...
评分由于学识尚浅，没有很高深的评论。 不知道是不是因为作者是女性的缘故，我认为她的分析是非常有“人情味儿”的。现在许多理论是机械式的，将人们当做有固定程式的机器人来进行分析的，而且常常令人感到冷漠和绝望——比如众所周知的理性经济人假设。而作者认为...
评分经济运行的基本模型即市场机制，市场作为“看不见的手”，以价格为信号引导着人们追求自我利益最大化，而很多时候，也“无心插柳”地促进了社会的公共利益。但是，面对垄断、外部性、信息不完全和公共物品领域等，市场存在着失灵的现象，这时便需要引入政府管制对模型进...
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制度设计
评分针对公地问题私有化&政府管制外的第三条道路，非常有启发性！(作者是第一位女性诺贝尔经济学奖获得者，????????
评分还要看其它书，只能匆匆一阅。奥女士的思路同前辈名家截然不同：奥尔森、哈丁醉心于提出简洁的、解释力涵盖各种组织和情境的模型，奥女士反对如此过分简化的做法，提倡找出具体情境中影响公用品制度和决策的变量，再以机制加以串联，成为分析框架，用以分析不同的个案积聚成理论；奥尔森、萨缪尔森将公共品和私人物品截然分开，奥女士则指出公用资源在个人攫取机制上形同私人物品，在提供和维持机制上又近似于公共品，两个冲突的机制在不同的策略互动中碰撞，这一进路解决了奥尔森留下的“选择性激励”到底如何界定的问题；前代理论假定博弈结构的外在限制恒定，国家市场等机制皆有过分简化的定义，故解决方法不是外来权力就是产权安排，奥女士则着重考察小型社区情境中个人如何在互动中设定和改变博弈规则、分配公用资源，提出社区产权的第三条路。
评分制度设计
评分还要看其它书，只能匆匆一阅。奥女士的思路同前辈名家截然不同：奥尔森、哈丁醉心于提出简洁的、解释力涵盖各种组织和情境的模型，奥女士反对如此过分简化的做法，提倡找出具体情境中影响公用品制度和决策的变量，再以机制加以串联，成为分析框架，用以分析不同的个案积聚成理论；奥尔森、萨缪尔森将公共品和私人物品截然分开，奥女士则指出公用资源在个人攫取机制上形同私人物品，在提供和维持机制上又近似于公共品，两个冲突的机制在不同的策略互动中碰撞，这一进路解决了奥尔森留下的“选择性激励”到底如何界定的问题；前代理论假定博弈结构的外在限制恒定，国家市场等机制皆有过分简化的定义，故解决方法不是外来权力就是产权安排，奥女士则着重考察小型社区情境中个人如何在互动中设定和改变博弈规则、分配公用资源，提出社区产权的第三条路。
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