Governing the Commons pdf epub mobi txt 电子书 下载 2025
Elinor Ostrom (née Awan; born August 7, 1933) is an American political economist.[2] She was awarded the 2009 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences, which she shared with Oliver E. Williamson, for "her analysis of economic governance, especially the commons."[3] She was the first, and to date, the only woman to win the prize in this category. Her work is associated with the new institutional economics and the resurgence of political economy.[4]
Ostrom lives in Bloomington, IN, and is on the faculty of both Indiana University and Arizona State University. She holds a Distinguished Professor at Indiana University and is the Arthur F. Bentley Professor of Political Science and Co-Director of the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis at Indiana University in Bloomington, as well as Research Professor and the Founding Director of the Center for the Study of Institutional Diversity at Arizona State University in Tempe. Ostrom also serves as a lead researcher for the Sustainable Agriculture and Natural Resource Management Collaborative Research Support Program (SANREM CRSP), managed by Virginia Tech and funded by USAID.[5]
- 经济学
- 制度
- 公共产权
- 政治学
- 美国
- PoliticalEconomy
- economics
- Political-Science
The governance of natural resources used by many individuals in common is an issue of increasing concern to policy analysts. Both state control and privatisation of resources have been advocated, but neither the state nor the market have been uniformly successful in solving common pool resource problems. Offering a critique of the foundations of policy analysis as applied to natural resources, Elinor Ostrom here provides a unique body of empirical data to explore conditions under which common pool resource problems have been satisfactorily or unsatisfactorily solved. Dr Ostrom first describes three models most frequently used as the foundation for recommending state or market solutions. She then outlines theoretical and empirical alternatives to these models in order to illustrate the diversity of possible solutions. In the following chapters she uses institutional analysis to examine different ways - both successful and unsuccessful - of governing the commons. In contrast to the proposition of the tragedy of the commons argument, common pool problems sometimes are solved by voluntary organisations rather than by a coercive state. Among the cases considered are communal tenure in meadows and forests, irrigation communities and other water rights, and fisheries.
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五年前在清华共管学院进修时曾听过奥斯特罗姆的讲座，但全程英文，且当时我并未看过她的经典著作《公共事物的治理之道》，奔赴她的讲座纯属对第一位获得诺贝尔经济学奖女性的好奇。学院的王亚华老师曾赴美在她手下学习过一段时间，在公管院那么长时间，我也只听过他一次讲座，...
评分奥斯特罗姆通过大量的事例，向我们介绍关于公共事务治理方法，并进行后续分析。由三个理论引出本书的内容分析，包括哈丁的“公地灾难”、“囚犯难题”及奥尔森的“集体行动的逻辑”。这些理论模型都说明，个人的理性行动最终导致的却是集体无理性的结果。 对此，以往认为的解...
评分首先承认这个标题确实有“姨学”的感觉，因为刘数卷阿姨经常把这句话挂在嘴边（无非就是指他们远邪党是中国未来的种子云云）。但是这句诗文本来就不是他的专利，他能用，我也能用。 这本书着实令我喜出望外------对山泽林薮这样的重要资源，到底是应该由国家进行管控还是应该由...
评分〇、写在前面： 这本书我只读了一遍，有些地方也不尽其然；对于全书的把握并非完全正确和深入，所以以下所有部分为个人观点，保留版权，切勿随意转载使用，仅供参考。 一、一些名词解释： 分权制企业：个人觉得这个“企业”翻译成组织或者结构就容易理解了，比如在修建水渠的...
用户评价
制度主义还是最喜欢North啊。可能是因为小型公共社区合作在中国缺乏传统吧，但写的非常好，经典。
评分看过较久，有些内容记不清了。大体记得是从“公用地悲剧”和博弈论出发解读collective action的一本书，中间列举丰富例证证明信息互动、共享价值观、外在监督的作用。最后的结论把作者的观点梳理得很清晰。作者自己是很有名的instistutionalism研究者，这本书写得也很透彻易懂（至少比起D.C.North是这样，斜眼）。
评分制度主义还是最喜欢North啊。可能是因为小型公共社区合作在中国缺乏传统吧，但写的非常好，经典。
评分"前代理论假定博弈结构的外在限制恒定，国家市场等机制皆有过分简化的定义，故解决方法不是外来权力就是产权安排，奥女士则着重考察小型社区情境中个人如何在互动中设定和改变博弈规则、分配公用资源，提出社区产权的第三条路。" 引自熊猫。只读了第一三六章的Chris
评分因为经典，所以近于常识；语言平顺，逻辑清晰。
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