Douglass C. North is also professor of history and a fellow of the Center in Political Economy. He was on the faculty of the University of Washington and held visiting chairs at Cambridge and Rice Universities. In 1993 he was awarded the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics. He is a fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences and has served as president of the Economic History Association and the Western Economic Association. His major interest is the evolution of economic and political institutions. The effects of institutions on the development of economies through time is a major emphasis in his work in both economic history and development. Among his books are The Rise of the Western World (with R. P. Thomas, 2nd edition), 1973, Growth and Welfare in the American Past, 1973, Structure and Change in Economic History, 1981, and Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance, 1990.
This is a landmark book on the impact of property rights on European economic development. Published over a quarter of a century ago, its stated goal is "... to suggest new paths for the study of European economic history rather than ... either [a detailed and exhaustive study or a precise empirical test that are the] ... standard formats" (p. vii). North and Thomas attempt to identify the elements that allowed the Western European economy to rise to affluence. Their argument is made transparent in Chapter One (Theory and Overview): the key to growth was and is an efficient economic system. Efficient in the sense that the system of property rights gives individuals incentives to innovate and produce, and, conversely inhibits those activities (rent-seeking, theft, arbitrary confiscation and/or excessive taxation) that reduce individual incentives. They argue that property rights are classic public goods because: (1) once a more efficient set of property rights is discovered the marginal cost of copying it is low (compared to the cost of discovering and developing it); (2) it is prohibitively expensive to prevent other political jurisdictions from emulating a more efficient set of property rights regardless of whether they contributed to their construction; (3) and finally, the idea of a set of property rights, like all ideas, is non-rival -- we can all consume the same idea and the "stock" of the idea is not diminished. These public good aspects lead them to conclude that there may be under investment in the attempts to create more efficient sets of property rights because the jurisdiction that invests in the development of property rights pays the entire cost of their development but receives only benefits that accrue to its jurisdiction, while other jurisdictions can get the benefits without any of the developmental costs. Thus, the problems of public goods and the "free riders."
似乎也就是那么几年之前,产权理论和新制度主义在中国大行其道,这种大行其道带着一个颇为简单的因果链条:经济增长来源于有效率的经济组织制度;那么自然而然地,我们要进一步保持经济增长,就要设计落实一套适合经济增长的制度。如果说这种解读的话语是国家主导的发展压力下...
評分第一章 问题 一、中心论点 本书的中心论点是有效率的经济组织是经济增长的关键;一个有效率的经济组织在西欧的发展正是西方兴起的原因所在。有效率的经济组织能够使个人的经济努力的私人收益率接近社会收益率,从而提供最有效的激励。市场机制能够发挥配置资源的作用关键还是参...
評分从拿起《经济史上的结构和变迁》,转而投向更浅显易入手的此书,我一直是目的导向的。想解决的问题就是“是什么阻止了人们自由、有尊严的活着,人的自由和尊严为什么是必要的”,比如财产、行动和思想自由,还有自己利益和常识不被践踏。因为现实的苦闷,因为看似漏洞...
評分 評分不知道是不是翻译的问题,这本书读起来阻塞,啰啰嗦嗦的重复着。原本以为是厉以宁翻译的,后来读来觉得这本翻译起来也就是太水了,才发现原来是厉以平。何许人也?闻所未闻! 全书围绕制度的安排,私有权的确定,形成了个人收益率等于社会收益率,于是产生了有效...
Efficient economic institution propelled the economic growth observed in western Europe.
评分Efficient economic institution propelled the economic growth observed in western Europe.
评分製度經濟學的經典之作!
评分人口本身不是問題,製度纔是關鍵。。但製度也要看社會進步的程度。。
评分這傢夥喜歡跑題。對每個國傢和時期論述時的重點與史料都使用不均,敘述中也不易分清這是曆史現象還是ideally根據經濟模型應該有的樣子。很重要的土地私有化可流轉的史實基本隻給瞭十三世紀英國的。對於最重要的論點:交易成本的降低,在荷蘭隻講到其然,未見最重要的所以然(為什麼在法國和西班牙就實現不瞭)。同樣解釋瞭西班牙卻解釋不瞭更復雜的北意大利。總體的論點是很整齊的。
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