Douglass C. North is also professor of history and a fellow of the Center in Political Economy. He was on the faculty of the University of Washington and held visiting chairs at Cambridge and Rice Universities. In 1993 he was awarded the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics. He is a fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences and has served as president of the Economic History Association and the Western Economic Association. His major interest is the evolution of economic and political institutions. The effects of institutions on the development of economies through time is a major emphasis in his work in both economic history and development. Among his books are The Rise of the Western World (with R. P. Thomas, 2nd edition), 1973, Growth and Welfare in the American Past, 1973, Structure and Change in Economic History, 1981, and Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance, 1990.
This is a landmark book on the impact of property rights on European economic development. Published over a quarter of a century ago, its stated goal is "... to suggest new paths for the study of European economic history rather than ... either [a detailed and exhaustive study or a precise empirical test that are the] ... standard formats" (p. vii). North and Thomas attempt to identify the elements that allowed the Western European economy to rise to affluence. Their argument is made transparent in Chapter One (Theory and Overview): the key to growth was and is an efficient economic system. Efficient in the sense that the system of property rights gives individuals incentives to innovate and produce, and, conversely inhibits those activities (rent-seeking, theft, arbitrary confiscation and/or excessive taxation) that reduce individual incentives. They argue that property rights are classic public goods because: (1) once a more efficient set of property rights is discovered the marginal cost of copying it is low (compared to the cost of discovering and developing it); (2) it is prohibitively expensive to prevent other political jurisdictions from emulating a more efficient set of property rights regardless of whether they contributed to their construction; (3) and finally, the idea of a set of property rights, like all ideas, is non-rival -- we can all consume the same idea and the "stock" of the idea is not diminished. These public good aspects lead them to conclude that there may be under investment in the attempts to create more efficient sets of property rights because the jurisdiction that invests in the development of property rights pays the entire cost of their development but receives only benefits that accrue to its jurisdiction, while other jurisdictions can get the benefits without any of the developmental costs. Thus, the problems of public goods and the "free riders."
似乎也就是那么几年之前,产权理论和新制度主义在中国大行其道,这种大行其道带着一个颇为简单的因果链条:经济增长来源于有效率的经济组织制度;那么自然而然地,我们要进一步保持经济增长,就要设计落实一套适合经济增长的制度。如果说这种解读的话语是国家主导的发展压力下...
评分 评分似乎也就是那么几年之前,产权理论和新制度主义在中国大行其道,这种大行其道带着一个颇为简单的因果链条:经济增长来源于有效率的经济组织制度;那么自然而然地,我们要进一步保持经济增长,就要设计落实一套适合经济增长的制度。如果说这种解读的话语是国家主导的发展压力下...
评分“路径依赖”。 延伸阅读 《经济史上的结构和变革》[美]道格拉斯·诺斯 《制度、制度变迁与经济绩效》[美]道格拉斯·诺斯 《understanding the process of economic change》[美]道格拉斯·诺斯 《西方世界的兴起》 作者: [美]道格拉斯·诺斯 / 罗伯特·托马斯 原作名:The Rise...
评分西方世界为何能够在近代兴起?这便是这本书要回答的问题。 什么才是经济增长的内在动因呢?这本书开宗明义的指出,“有效率的经济组织是经济增长的核心”,这也是西欧崛起的原因。而有效率的组织需要建立产权制度,以刺激“将个人的经济努力变成私人收益率接近社会收益率”的活...
我始终还是觉得 黑死病主义是流氓行为、、
评分Efficient economic institution propelled the economic growth observed in western Europe.
评分Efficient economic institution propelled the economic growth observed in western Europe.
评分啰啰嗦嗦
评分看了一半英文,一半中文
本站所有内容均为互联网搜索引擎提供的公开搜索信息,本站不存储任何数据与内容,任何内容与数据均与本站无关,如有需要请联系相关搜索引擎包括但不限于百度,google,bing,sogou 等
© 2025 book.quotespace.org All Rights Reserved. 小美书屋 版权所有