Daron Acemoglu is Charles P. Kindleberger Professor of Applied Economics at The Massachusetts Institute of Technology and a member of the Canadian Institute for Advanced Research's Program on Institutions, Organizations, and Growth. He received the 2005 John Bates Clark Medal awarded by the American Economic Association to the best economist working in the United States under age 40. He is the author of the textbook Introduction to Modern Economic Growth and coeditor of Econometrica and NBER Macroannual.
James A. Robinson is Professor of Government at Harvard University. He is a Faculty Associate at the Institute for Quantitative Social Science and the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs and is a member of the Canadian Institute for Advanced Research's Program on Institutions, Organizations, and Growth. He is coeditor with Jared Diamond of Natural Experiments in History (2009).
What forces lead to democracy's creation? Why does it sometimes consolidate only to collapse at other times? Written by two of the foremost authorities on this subject in the world, this volume develops a framework for analyzing the creation and consolidation of democracy. It revolutionizes scholarship on the factors underlying government and popular movements toward democracy or dictatorship. Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson argue that different social groups prefer different political institutions because of the way they allocate political power and resources. Their book, the subject of a four-day seminar at Harvard's Center for Basic Research in the Social Sciences, was also the basis for the Walras-Bowley lecture at the joint meetings of the European Economic Association and Econometric Society in 2003 and is the winner of the John Bates Clark Medal.
Daron Acemoglu在这本书中其实就是要说,经济对民主很重要,经济为民主的产生提出了一个机制。政治学和经济学的根本区别是,政治学是研究冲突的学科,这就与经济学的分析方法矛盾。而Acemoglu在这里,从人的选择出发,研究了在什么时候和在什么条件下,独裁、民主、镇压、让步...
评分说是评论,其实完全没有必要,因为本书的内容是如此的完整和清晰以至于任何说明乃至于困惑的评论都没有空间,作者充分贯彻了研究的铁律【说光所有的故事,让其他人说个球】。 我想对经济学或政治经济学不太熟悉的尤其是政治学社会学的童鞋看到书名应该首先会呵呵,变量太多不好...
评分《政治发展的经济分析》——达龙阿西莫格鲁 作者用高度抽象的博弈模型来分析民主与经济的关系,优点是逻辑关系清晰,缺点是对于具体事件,还要具体研究。 一、民主是对未来权力分配的可信承若。 民众人数较多,当组织起来争取权力时能暂时掌握事实政治权力(实力),并要求得到...
评分说是评论,其实完全没有必要,因为本书的内容是如此的完整和清晰以至于任何说明乃至于困惑的评论都没有空间,作者充分贯彻了研究的铁律【说光所有的故事,让其他人说个球】。 我想对经济学或政治经济学不太熟悉的尤其是政治学社会学的童鞋看到书名应该首先会呵呵,变量太多不好...
牛逼。
评分可以从nondemocracy这章开始看,因为democracy那一章都是中间选民和唐斯模型。acemoglu一直都是开始的想法很简单,但是总能从最简洁的模型中勾勒出一般性的模型来解释非常复杂的问题。这样做的缺陷也是非常明显的,尤其在涉足政治历史话题的时候,所以political science的人当然对他不买账。革命的群体可能并不能一般化为穷人,民主的收益与结果可能也取决于各国的历史文化政治遗产。但这也是对political science规范化的一种尝试。
评分看完只能说牛,非常佩服
评分我还是买paperback吧,省钱。2011年12月,不要好高骛远。
评分民主研究的必读,细细咀嚼
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