Daron Acemoglu is Charles P. Kindleberger Professor of Applied Economics at The Massachusetts Institute of Technology and a member of the Canadian Institute for Advanced Research's Program on Institutions, Organizations, and Growth. He received the 2005 John Bates Clark Medal awarded by the American Economic Association to the best economist working in the United States under age 40. He is the author of the textbook Introduction to Modern Economic Growth and coeditor of Econometrica and NBER Macroannual.
James A. Robinson is Professor of Government at Harvard University. He is a Faculty Associate at the Institute for Quantitative Social Science and the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs and is a member of the Canadian Institute for Advanced Research's Program on Institutions, Organizations, and Growth. He is coeditor with Jared Diamond of Natural Experiments in History (2009).
What forces lead to democracy's creation? Why does it sometimes consolidate only to collapse at other times? Written by two of the foremost authorities on this subject in the world, this volume develops a framework for analyzing the creation and consolidation of democracy. It revolutionizes scholarship on the factors underlying government and popular movements toward democracy or dictatorship. Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson argue that different social groups prefer different political institutions because of the way they allocate political power and resources. Their book, the subject of a four-day seminar at Harvard's Center for Basic Research in the Social Sciences, was also the basis for the Walras-Bowley lecture at the joint meetings of the European Economic Association and Econometric Society in 2003 and is the winner of the John Bates Clark Medal.
Daron Acemoglu在这本书中其实就是要说,经济对民主很重要,经济为民主的产生提出了一个机制。政治学和经济学的根本区别是,政治学是研究冲突的学科,这就与经济学的分析方法矛盾。而Acemoglu在这里,从人的选择出发,研究了在什么时候和在什么条件下,独裁、民主、镇压、让步...
评分扫了一下豆瓣上这本书的评论,看到有人提到越不平等的社会越容易出现革命的这个说法。其实书里面并不是这么表述的。作者们的意思,如果我理解准确的话,应该是,出现革命的威胁和政治经济上不平等的关系是一个U型曲线。在社会平等的状态下,革命的威胁就会相对比较低,而在一定...
评分他们的argument是这样的: 非民主制度有利于精英的经济利益分配,民主制度有利于大众的经济利益分配。 是否民主取决于精英和大众的政治力量。 政治力量分两种:事实上的和法理上的。 事实政治力量是短暂集结的,过期就会消失,但事实力量能帮助精英或大众夺权,体现在政变和民...
评分他们的argument是这样的: 非民主制度有利于精英的经济利益分配,民主制度有利于大众的经济利益分配。 是否民主取决于精英和大众的政治力量。 政治力量分两种:事实上的和法理上的。 事实政治力量是短暂集结的,过期就会消失,但事实力量能帮助精英或大众夺权,体现在政变和民...
评分说是评论,其实完全没有必要,因为本书的内容是如此的完整和清晰以至于任何说明乃至于困惑的评论都没有空间,作者充分贯彻了研究的铁律【说光所有的故事,让其他人说个球】。 我想对经济学或政治经济学不太熟悉的尤其是政治学社会学的童鞋看到书名应该首先会呵呵,变量太多不好...
难怪有些人觉得现在经济学家来做政治科学是不负责,这都是什么啊。
评分这是本好书!- -
评分Acemoglu 实在是太厉害了!!我非常佩服他
评分基本上就是一本解Markov Perfect Equilibrium的书。建模思想很简单但是结论很强大。
评分牛逼。
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