圖書標籤: 金融學 美國 經濟史 比較政治經濟學 金融危機 金融 經濟危機 比較政治
发表于2024-12-24
The Power of Inaction pdf epub mobi txt 電子書 下載 2024
Bank bailouts in the aftermath of the collapse of Lehman Brothers and the onset of the Great Recession brought into sharp relief the power that the global financial sector holds over national politics, and provoked widespread public outrage. In The Power of Inaction, Cornelia Woll details the varying relationships between financial institutions and national governments by comparing national bank rescue schemes in the United States and Europe. Woll starts with a broad overview of bank bailouts in more than twenty countries. Using extensive interviews conducted with bankers, lawmakers, and other key players, she then examines three pairs of countries where similar outcomes might be expected: the United States and United Kingdom, France and Germany, Ireland and Denmark. She finds, however, substantial variation within these pairs. In some cases the financial sector is intimately involved in the design of bailout packages; elsewhere it chooses to remain at arm’s length.
Such differences are often ascribed to one of two conditions: either the state is strong and can impose terms, or the state is weak and corrupted by industry lobbying. Woll presents a third option, where the inaction of the financial sector critically shapes the design of bailout packages in favor of the industry. She demonstrates that financial institutions were most powerful in those settings where they could avoid a joint response and force national policymakers to deal with banks on a piecemeal basis. The power to remain collectively inactive, she argues, has had important consequences for bailout arrangements and ultimately affected how the public and private sectors have shared the cost burden of these massive policy decisions.
Prof. Dr. Cornelia Woll
2013–present Professor of Political Science, Sciences Po Paris
2012–present Director at the Max Planck Sciences Po Center on Coping with Instability in Market Societies (MaxPo), Paris
2012–present Research Associate at the Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies, Cologne, and Affiliated Faculty Member of the International Max Planck Research School on the Social and Political Constitution of the Economy (IMPRS-SPCE), Cologne
2011–2014 Co-Founder and Co-Director of the Interdisciplinary Center for Public Policy Evaluation (LIEPP) at Sciences Po Paris
2008–2012 Associate Dean for Research, Sciences Po, Paris
2011–2012 Visiting Scholar, Minda de Gunzburg Center for European Studies, Harvard University
2009–2012 Head of Otto Hahn Junior Research Group funded by the Max Planck Society at the Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies, Cologne, and Sciences Po, Paris
2006–2013 Tenured Research Fellow, Center for International Studies and Research (CERI), Sciences Po, Paris
2002–2006 Research Fellow, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies, Cologne
2002–2003 Stays as a visiting researcher at American Institute for Contemporary German Studies, Johns Hopkins University and BMW Center for German and European Studies, Georgetown University (both in Washington, DC), and at European University Institute, Florence
金融危機後各國扶助銀行與金融係統脫睏措施的比較研究。銀金係統除傳統的製度結構性(銀金體製與其他經濟領域之關係及對政府政策之限製)和知識生産與組織(銀金精英與政府精英之政治聯盟)權力,集體行動不力也是可行戰略:銀金係統缺乏集體行動的傳統、機製或少數領頭代錶時,整個行業麵對危機采取惰性,迫使政府承擔道德風險介入挽救,讓納稅人承擔救市成本。英美皆號稱自由市場代錶,但美國銀金係統嚮無集體行動與政府協商之基礎,故美國救市措施混亂而最終由政府包底,英國則早早放棄行業集體行動幻想而在救市中附加強力限製與管製條款。德法均號稱管製資本主義,但德國銀行體係中大小銀行受害程度和急迫問題不一,集體行動不成,法國則早早由政府牽頭六大銀行鼓勵小機構參與。喪失貨幣自主的愛爾蘭也無法像丹麥一樣以犧牲匯率為代價實行集體救市。
評分金融危機後各國扶助銀行與金融係統脫睏措施的比較研究。銀金係統除傳統的製度結構性(銀金體製與其他經濟領域之關係及對政府政策之限製)和知識生産與組織(銀金精英與政府精英之政治聯盟)權力,集體行動不力也是可行戰略:銀金係統缺乏集體行動的傳統、機製或少數領頭代錶時,整個行業麵對危機采取惰性,迫使政府承擔道德風險介入挽救,讓納稅人承擔救市成本。英美皆號稱自由市場代錶,但美國銀金係統嚮無集體行動與政府協商之基礎,故美國救市措施混亂而最終由政府包底,英國則早早放棄行業集體行動幻想而在救市中附加強力限製與管製條款。德法均號稱管製資本主義,但德國銀行體係中大小銀行受害程度和急迫問題不一,集體行動不成,法國則早早由政府牽頭六大銀行鼓勵小機構參與。喪失貨幣自主的愛爾蘭也無法像丹麥一樣以犧牲匯率為代價實行集體救市。
評分金融危機後各國扶助銀行與金融係統脫睏措施的比較研究。銀金係統除傳統的製度結構性(銀金體製與其他經濟領域之關係及對政府政策之限製)和知識生産與組織(銀金精英與政府精英之政治聯盟)權力,集體行動不力也是可行戰略:銀金係統缺乏集體行動的傳統、機製或少數領頭代錶時,整個行業麵對危機采取惰性,迫使政府承擔道德風險介入挽救,讓納稅人承擔救市成本。英美皆號稱自由市場代錶,但美國銀金係統嚮無集體行動與政府協商之基礎,故美國救市措施混亂而最終由政府包底,英國則早早放棄行業集體行動幻想而在救市中附加強力限製與管製條款。德法均號稱管製資本主義,但德國銀行體係中大小銀行受害程度和急迫問題不一,集體行動不成,法國則早早由政府牽頭六大銀行鼓勵小機構參與。喪失貨幣自主的愛爾蘭也無法像丹麥一樣以犧牲匯率為代價實行集體救市。
評分金融危機後各國扶助銀行與金融係統脫睏措施的比較研究。銀金係統除傳統的製度結構性(銀金體製與其他經濟領域之關係及對政府政策之限製)和知識生産與組織(銀金精英與政府精英之政治聯盟)權力,集體行動不力也是可行戰略:銀金係統缺乏集體行動的傳統、機製或少數領頭代錶時,整個行業麵對危機采取惰性,迫使政府承擔道德風險介入挽救,讓納稅人承擔救市成本。英美皆號稱自由市場代錶,但美國銀金係統嚮無集體行動與政府協商之基礎,故美國救市措施混亂而最終由政府包底,英國則早早放棄行業集體行動幻想而在救市中附加強力限製與管製條款。德法均號稱管製資本主義,但德國銀行體係中大小銀行受害程度和急迫問題不一,集體行動不成,法國則早早由政府牽頭六大銀行鼓勵小機構參與。喪失貨幣自主的愛爾蘭也無法像丹麥一樣以犧牲匯率為代價實行集體救市。
評分金融危機後各國扶助銀行與金融係統脫睏措施的比較研究。銀金係統除傳統的製度結構性(銀金體製與其他經濟領域之關係及對政府政策之限製)和知識生産與組織(銀金精英與政府精英之政治聯盟)權力,集體行動不力也是可行戰略:銀金係統缺乏集體行動的傳統、機製或少數領頭代錶時,整個行業麵對危機采取惰性,迫使政府承擔道德風險介入挽救,讓納稅人承擔救市成本。英美皆號稱自由市場代錶,但美國銀金係統嚮無集體行動與政府協商之基礎,故美國救市措施混亂而最終由政府包底,英國則早早放棄行業集體行動幻想而在救市中附加強力限製與管製條款。德法均號稱管製資本主義,但德國銀行體係中大小銀行受害程度和急迫問題不一,集體行動不成,法國則早早由政府牽頭六大銀行鼓勵小機構參與。喪失貨幣自主的愛爾蘭也無法像丹麥一樣以犧牲匯率為代價實行集體救市。
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The Power of Inaction pdf epub mobi txt 電子書 下載 2024