The Logic of Collective Action pdf epub mobi txt 電子書 下載2025
Mancur Lloyd Olson, Jr. (pronounced /ˈmænsər/[1] or /ˈmæŋkər/; January 22, 1932 – February 19, 1998) was a leading American economist and social scientist who, at the time of his death, worked at the University of Maryland, College Park. Among other areas, he made contributions to institutional economics on the role of private property, taxation, public goods, collective action and contract rights in economic development. Olson focused on the logical basis of interest group membership and participation. The reigning political theories of his day granted groups an almost primordial status. Some appealed to a natural human instinct for herding, others ascribed the formation of groups that are rooted in kinship to the process of modernization. Olson offered a radically different account of the logical basis of organized collective action.
- 經濟學
- 政治學
- 社會學
- 集體行動
- economics
- 社會理論
- 奧爾森
- MancurOlson
This book develops an original theory of group and organizational behavior that cuts across disciplinary lines and illustrates the theory with empirical and historical studies of particular organizations. Applying economic analysis to the subjects of the political scientist, sociologist, and economist, Mr. Olson examines the extent to which the individuals that share a common interest find it in their individual interest to bear the costs of the organizational effort.
The theory shows that most organizations produce what the economist calls "public goods"--goods or services that are available to every member, whether or not he has borne any of the costs of providing them. Economists have long understood that defense, law and order were public goods that could not be marketed to individuals, and that taxation was necessary. They have not, however, taken account of the fact that private as well as governmental organizations produce public goods.
具體描述
讀後感
我一直想不清楚工会的问题。认同经济学原理的人，基本都会认可，工会对于工人作为一整体的福祉是有害无益的。如果在劳动力市场上有许多剩余劳力，老板要是受不了工会了，只需要把工人全都辞退，雇一批新人就可以了（当然为此要付一点成本）。工会的作用，只不过给劳动力市场增...
評分 評分“一个和尚挑水吃，两个和尚抬水吃，三个和尚没水吃。”这句耳熟能详的谚语故事想必很多人都知道。但我们往往只停留在故事本身的趣味性上，而忽视了它真正想表达的含义：“在一个群体中，随着人数的增多，人们主动为集体贡献的意愿会不断降低。” 我们生活中也到处是这样的例子...
評分 評分用戶評價
對於此書褒揚和運用已經甚多，無須贅述。反而有另外幾點值得提齣。一是，運用此書經常是批評大政府、階級政治等理念的無效，因為個人不肯貢獻力量取得公共品，但其實更好的運用可能是“逆用”或針對其問題的思考，即如何針對理性個人維護私利的特性，設計齣有效的激勵或威懾體製動員個人投身組織；二是，奧爾森把組織的公共品和選擇性激勵/私人收益截然分開，似乎值得商榷，這兩者或許在有重閤的時候能鼓勵個人行動（如諾斯所言），選擇性激勵也可以是所得公共品的優先分配—所以這裏公共利益在組織行動前後的性質會發生嬗變？三是，奧爾森的理論已經指明瞭交易成本（他稱為談判成本）在組織中的重要作用，比新製度經濟學諸君早；最後，不同於許多時人，書中清楚錶示理性人和經濟理論運用有其局限，此書無法涵蓋許多社會政治宗教方麵集體行動。
评分對於此書褒揚和運用已經甚多，無須贅述。反而有另外幾點值得提齣。一是，運用此書經常是批評大政府、階級政治等理念的無效，因為個人不肯貢獻力量取得公共品，但其實更好的運用可能是“逆用”或針對其問題的思考，即如何針對理性個人維護私利的特性，設計齣有效的激勵或威懾體製動員個人投身組織；二是，奧爾森把組織的公共品和選擇性激勵/私人收益截然分開，似乎值得商榷，這兩者或許在有重閤的時候能鼓勵個人行動（如諾斯所言），選擇性激勵也可以是所得公共品的優先分配—所以這裏公共利益在組織行動前後的性質會發生嬗變？三是，奧爾森的理論已經指明瞭交易成本（他稱為談判成本）在組織中的重要作用，比新製度經濟學諸君早；最後，不同於許多時人，書中清楚錶示理性人和經濟理論運用有其局限，此書無法涵蓋許多社會政治宗教方麵集體行動。
评分members of large groups have no incentives to take collective action to obtain collective goods
评分三個和尚沒水喝...
评分翻來覆去就是說個很簡單的道理。難得在說的非常好！
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