Mancur Lloyd Olson, Jr. (pronounced /ˈmænsər/[1] or /ˈmæŋkər/; January 22, 1932 – February 19, 1998) was a leading American economist and social scientist who, at the time of his death, worked at the University of Maryland, College Park. Among other areas, he made contributions to institutional economics on the role of private property, taxation, public goods, collective action and contract rights in economic development. Olson focused on the logical basis of interest group membership and participation. The reigning political theories of his day granted groups an almost primordial status. Some appealed to a natural human instinct for herding, others ascribed the formation of groups that are rooted in kinship to the process of modernization. Olson offered a radically different account of the logical basis of organized collective action.
This book develops an original theory of group and organizational behavior that cuts across disciplinary lines and illustrates the theory with empirical and historical studies of particular organizations. Applying economic analysis to the subjects of the political scientist, sociologist, and economist, Mr. Olson examines the extent to which the individuals that share a common interest find it in their individual interest to bear the costs of the organizational effort.
The theory shows that most organizations produce what the economist calls "public goods"--goods or services that are available to every member, whether or not he has borne any of the costs of providing them. Economists have long understood that defense, law and order were public goods that could not be marketed to individuals, and that taxation was necessary. They have not, however, taken account of the fact that private as well as governmental organizations produce public goods.
奥尔森教授阐述了一个社会科学研究中的最基本的问题:集体行动会发生吗?传统智慧(加尔布雷斯)认为:集体的存在是为了增进集体的利益,理性的集体成员都会为了集体的利益而行动,也即亚当斯密提到的理性的个人采取行动,达致的结果是社会的共同利益,换言之就是个人理性会导...
评分 评分奥尔森的这本《集体行动的逻辑》,是建立在理性人的假设基础上的。传统的看法认为“有共同利益的个人组成的集团通常总是试图增进那些共同的利益”,比如马克思的阶级观、民主国家中的“罢工”行为等。但是奥尔森教授从理性的“个体”展开研究之后,认为在大规模群体的集体...
评分“一个和尚挑水吃,两个和尚抬水吃,三个和尚没水吃。”这句耳熟能详的谚语故事想必很多人都知道。但我们往往只停留在故事本身的趣味性上,而忽视了它真正想表达的含义:“在一个群体中,随着人数的增多,人们主动为集体贡献的意愿会不断降低。” 我们生活中也到处是这样的例子...
评分对于此书褒扬和运用已经甚多,无须赘述。反而有另外几点值得提出。一是,运用此书经常是批评大政府、阶级政治等理念的无效,因为个人不肯贡献力量取得公共品,但其实更好的运用可能是“逆用”或针对其问题的思考,即如何针对理性个人维护私利的特性,设计出有效的激励或威慑体制动员个人投身组织;二是,奥尔森把组织的公共品和选择性激励/私人收益截然分开,似乎值得商榷,这两者或许在有重合的时候能鼓励个人行动(如诺斯所言),选择性激励也可以是所得公共品的优先分配—所以这里公共利益在组织行动前后的性质会发生嬗变?三是,奥尔森的理论已经指明了交易成本(他称为谈判成本)在组织中的重要作用,比新制度经济学诸君早;最后,不同于许多时人,书中清楚表示理性人和经济理论运用有其局限,此书无法涵盖许多社会政治宗教方面集体行动。
评分第一章看了好久还是云里雾里,果然还是不适合学经济。。
评分Smart book. A footnote of Nietzsche's philosophy.
评分Thesis: Members of large groups tend not to sacrifice for collective good.
评分对于此书褒扬和运用已经甚多,无须赘述。反而有另外几点值得提出。一是,运用此书经常是批评大政府、阶级政治等理念的无效,因为个人不肯贡献力量取得公共品,但其实更好的运用可能是“逆用”或针对其问题的思考,即如何针对理性个人维护私利的特性,设计出有效的激励或威慑体制动员个人投身组织;二是,奥尔森把组织的公共品和选择性激励/私人收益截然分开,似乎值得商榷,这两者或许在有重合的时候能鼓励个人行动(如诺斯所言),选择性激励也可以是所得公共品的优先分配—所以这里公共利益在组织行动前后的性质会发生嬗变?三是,奥尔森的理论已经指明了交易成本(他称为谈判成本)在组织中的重要作用,比新制度经济学诸君早;最后,不同于许多时人,书中清楚表示理性人和经济理论运用有其局限,此书无法涵盖许多社会政治宗教方面集体行动。
本站所有内容均为互联网搜索引擎提供的公开搜索信息,本站不存储任何数据与内容,任何内容与数据均与本站无关,如有需要请联系相关搜索引擎包括但不限于百度,google,bing,sogou 等
© 2025 book.quotespace.org All Rights Reserved. 小美书屋 版权所有