图书标签: 经济学 政治学 社会学 集体行动 economics 社会理论 奥尔森 MancurOlson
发表于2025-01-10
The Logic of Collective Action pdf epub mobi txt 电子书 下载 2025
This book develops an original theory of group and organizational behavior that cuts across disciplinary lines and illustrates the theory with empirical and historical studies of particular organizations. Applying economic analysis to the subjects of the political scientist, sociologist, and economist, Mr. Olson examines the extent to which the individuals that share a common interest find it in their individual interest to bear the costs of the organizational effort.
The theory shows that most organizations produce what the economist calls "public goods"--goods or services that are available to every member, whether or not he has borne any of the costs of providing them. Economists have long understood that defense, law and order were public goods that could not be marketed to individuals, and that taxation was necessary. They have not, however, taken account of the fact that private as well as governmental organizations produce public goods.
Mancur Lloyd Olson, Jr. (pronounced /ˈmænsər/[1] or /ˈmæŋkər/; January 22, 1932 – February 19, 1998) was a leading American economist and social scientist who, at the time of his death, worked at the University of Maryland, College Park. Among other areas, he made contributions to institutional economics on the role of private property, taxation, public goods, collective action and contract rights in economic development. Olson focused on the logical basis of interest group membership and participation. The reigning political theories of his day granted groups an almost primordial status. Some appealed to a natural human instinct for herding, others ascribed the formation of groups that are rooted in kinship to the process of modernization. Olson offered a radically different account of the logical basis of organized collective action.
三个和尚没水喝...
评分懂了个大意。寒假前四章要仔细重读。一个观点很赞同:共同利益未必带来集体行动,因为当集体较大时,搭便车行为开始变得显著(说句俏皮话叫做三个和尚没水喝),若无选择性动机(selective incentive),集体可能无法有效完成行动。Downs(1959)也讨论过类似问题,不过是从理性无知角度探讨的。小利益集团由于获利大,比平均分得利益较少的大集团更具有行动力也通常更有影响力,看爱荷华的农民就是一例,所以Mancur的讨论很有现实意义。同时认为意识形态决定的行为通常无法持久,似乎也有历史支持。是从一个非Huntington角度观察香港示威游行的实践理论机会。哈佛大学Trumbull教授的反驳很有趣,但具有合法溢价的合法联合是否能,在什么情况下能被动员还需看他的书才可再论。
评分全书行文非常晦涩,背景知识是当年完全无知的工人运动与欧洲历史,但“搭便车”的概念却深入人心,对群众运动有了奇怪的认知
评分第一章看了好久还是云里雾里,果然还是不适合学经济。。
评分Thesis: Members of large groups tend not to sacrifice for collective good.
《集体行动的逻辑》的读后感 老师在这本书中提出的引导性问题是关于“在国家政治中,利益集团是一种好的力量还是坏的力量”。有关集体的行动代表的是一种关于利益集团理论的运作过程。集体顾名思义,就是有共同利益的个人为了某种利己的目的而汇集在一起所形成的团体。而集体行...
评分1.最近又翻看了一下这本书,买了10几年,书都发黄了。 2.原理仍然没问题,但时代多了互联网,结论可能会有较大变化。 3.行动成本与收益的测量是奥尔森理论的基础。 4.由于互联网的出现,行动成本,尤其是行动的串联成本大大降低,因此,在这个意义上,大集团的行动性质向小集团...
评分 评分 评分转的。 我一直想不清楚工会的问题。认同经济学原理的人,基本都会认可,工会对于工人作为一整体的福祉是有害无益的。如果在劳动力市场上有许多剩余劳力,老板要是受不了工会了,只需要把工人全都辞退,雇一批新人就可以了(当然为此要付一点成本)。工会的作用,只不过给劳动力...
The Logic of Collective Action pdf epub mobi txt 电子书 下载 2025