Naming and Necessity pdf epub mobi txt 電子書下載2025

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Saul Aaron Kripke is an American philosopher and logician now emeritus from Princeton and professor of philosophy at CUNY Graduate Center. He has been immensely influential in a number of fields related to logic and philosophy of language. Much of his work remains unpublished or exists only as tape-recordings and privately circulated manuscripts. He is nonetheless widely regarded as the foremost philosopher of the turn of the millenium, and was the winner of the 2001 Schock Prize in Logic and Philosophy.

出版者:Harvard University Press

作者:Saul A. Kripke

出品人:

頁數:192

译者:

出版時間:1980-7-26

價格:USD 25.00

裝幀:Paperback

isbn號碼:9780674598461

叢書系列:

圖書標籤:

哲學
語言哲學
分析哲學
Kripke
剋裏普剋
形而上學
Philosophy
語言

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If there is such a thing as essential reading in metaphysics or in philosophy of language, this is it.

Ever since the publication of its original version, Naming and Necessity has had great and increasing influence. It redirected philosophical attention to neglected questions of natural and metaphysical necessity and to the connections between these and theories of reference, in particular of naming, and of identity. From a critique of the dominant tendency to assimilate names to descriptions and more generally to treat their reference as a function of their Fregean sense, surprisingly deep and widespread consequences may be drawn. The largely discredited distinction between accidental and essential properties, both of individual things (including people) and of kinds of things, is revived. So is a consequent view of science as what seeks out the essences of natural kinds. Traditional objections to such views are dealt with by sharpening distinctions between epistemic and metaphysical necessity; in particular by the startling admission of necessary a posteriori truths. From these, in particular from identity statements using rigid designators whether of things or of kinds, further remarkable consequences are drawn for the natures of things, of people, and of kinds; strong objections follow, for example to identity versions of materialism as a theory of the mind.

This seminal work, to which today's thriving essentialist metaphysics largely owes its impetus, is here published with a substantial new Preface by the author.