Moral Relativism and Moral Objectivity pdf epub mobi txt 电子书下载 2025

简体网页||繁体网页

☆☆☆☆☆

出版者:Blackwell Pub

作者:Gilbert Harman

出品人:

页数:225

译者:

出版时间:1996-2

价格:USD 37.34

装帧:Paperback

isbn号码:9780631192091

丛书系列:

图书标签:

英文
哲學
倫理學
伦理学
1996
道德相对主义
道德客观主义
伦理学
形而上学
认识论
道德哲学
价值观
道德理论
文化差异
道德判断

下载链接在页面底部

facebook linkedin mastodon messenger pinterest reddit telegram twitter viber vkontakte whatsapp 复制链接

想要找书就要到小美书屋

book.quotespace.org

立刻按 ctrl+D收藏本页

你会得到大惊喜!!

具体描述

Do moral questions have objective answers? In this great debate, Gilbert Harman explains and argues for relativism, emotivism, and moral scepticism. In his view, moral disagreements are like disagreements about what to pay for a house; there are no correct answers ahead of time, except in relation to one or another moral framework.

Independently, Judith Jarvis Thomson examines what she takes to be the case against moral objectivity, and rejects it; she argues that it is possible to find out the correct answers to some moral questions. In her view, some moral disagreements are like disagreements about whether the house has a ghost.

Harman and Thomson then reply to each other. This important, lively accessible exchange will be invaluable to all students of moral theory and meta-ethics.

作者简介

目录信息

Preface.
Part I: Moral Relativism (Harman):.
1. Moral Relativism.
2. Social Contracts.
3. Expressing Basic Disagreement.
4. Universality of Practical Reasons?.
5. Judgements about Outsiders.
Part II: Moral Objectivity (Thomson):.
6. Epistemological Arguments for Moral Skepticism.
7. Emotivism.
8. Evaluations and Directives.
Part III: Responses:.
9. Harman′s Response to Thomson′s Part II.
10. Thomson′s Response to Harman′s Part I.
Bibliography.
· · · · · · (收起)