Fictionalism in Metaphysics pdf epub mobi txt 電子書下載2025

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出版者:Clarendon Press

作者:Kalderon, Mark Eli 編

出品人:

頁數:368

译者:

出版時間:2005-9-1

價格:USD 56.00

裝幀:Paperback

isbn號碼:9780199282197

叢書系列:

圖書標籤:

邏輯哲學
數學哲學
哲學
M.Kalderon
Fictionalism
fictionalism metaphysics philosophy epistemology ontology realism anti-realism

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具體描述

Fictionalism is the view that a serious intellectual inquiry need not aim at truth. It came to prominence in philosophy in 1980, when Hartry Field argued that mathematics does not have to be true to be good, and Bas van Fraassen argued that the aim of science is not truth but empirical adequacy. Both suggested that the acceptance of a mathematical or scientific theory need not involve belief in its content. Thus the distinctive commitment of fictionalism is that acceptance in a given domain of inquiry need not be truth-normed, and that the acceptance of a sentence from the associated region of discourse need not involve belief in its content. In metaphysics fictionalism is now widely regarded as an option worthy of serious consideration. This volume represents a major benchmark in the debate: it brings together an impressive international team of contributors, whose essays (all but one of them appearing here for the first time) represent the state of the art in various areas of metaphysical controversy, relating to language, mathematics, modality, truth, belief, ontology, and morality.

著者簡介

圖書目錄

Contents......Page 8
Notes on Contributors......Page 10
Introduction......Page 12
1 Problems in the History of Fictionalism......Page 25
2 Metaphor and Prop Oriented Make-Believe......Page 76
3 The Myth of the Seven......Page 99
4 Modal Fictionalism and Analysis......Page 127
5 Truth as a Pretense......Page 145
6 Belief about Nothing in Particular......Page 189
7 Fictionalist Attitudes about Fictional Matters......Page 215
8 What we Disagree about when we Disagree about Ontology......Page 245
9 Moral Fictionalism......Page 298
10 Quasi-Realism is Fictionalism......Page 325
11 Quasi-Realism no Fictionalism......Page 333
References......Page 350
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