Why did Napoleon succeed in 1805 but fail in 1812? Could the European half of World War II have been ended in 1944? These are only two of the many questions that form the subject-matter of this meticulously researched, lively 2004 book. Drawing on a very wide range of sources, van Creveld examines the specifics of war: namely, those formidable problems of movement and supply, transportation and administration, so often mentioned - but rarely explored - by the vast majority of books on military history. In doing so he casts his net far and wide, from Gustavus Adolphus to Rommel, from Marlborough to Patton, subjecting the operations of each to a thorough analysis from an unusual point of view. In this edition with a new introduction, van Creveld revisits his now-classic text, and comments in a new afterword on the role of logistics in high-tech, modern warfare.
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Kindle中文版
评分对各个时期的战争后勤有很透彻的分析,提出有时战略完全是为了满足后勤的需要,不亏是有深入研究的行家里手
评分对各个时期的战争后勤有很透彻的分析,提出有时战略完全是为了满足后勤的需要,不亏是有深入研究的行家里手
评分读了80年代的中译本(可能是节译),仅仅是陆军后勤史,截止于二战,不过瘾。“战略,在很大程度上成了后勤的附庸。。。”
评分读了80年代的中译本(可能是节译),仅仅是陆军后勤史,截止于二战,不过瘾。“战略,在很大程度上成了后勤的附庸。。。”
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