In this controversial book, Keith Krehbiel investigates and casts doubt upon a view of Congress held by many academics, journalists, and members of the lay public: that Congress is organized primarily to facilitate logrolling or "gains from trade" between legislators. The author puts forward an alternative "informational" theory that, unlike previous formal theories, highlights institutional needs and individual incentives for acquiring policy expertise. Using games with incomplete information, Krehbiel derives a set of unique and testable predictions about the organization of legislatures -- including the composition of committees and the procedures under which legislation is considered.
Krehbiel's creative illustrations and nonmathematical presentation of formal theories make this book accessible to a diverse set of readers. The political relevance and testability of games with incomplete information will be appreciated by game theorists and economists, while the book's findings make it essential reading for political scientists who study American politics, political institutions, or democratic legislatures.
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立法机构的信息理论
评分对美国国会组织的经验研究，检验的假说直接基于formal theories。主要洞见是，国会的委员会制度以及相关立法流程主要作用是促进分工和信息传输。主要怼了以Shepsle，Weingast和Marshall为代表的、把委员会体系当成制度化分配猪肉桶工具的理论。
评分对美国国会组织的经验研究，检验的假说直接基于formal theories。主要洞见是，国会的委员会制度以及相关立法流程主要作用是促进分工和信息传输。主要怼了以Shepsle，Weingast和Marshall为代表的、把委员会体系当成制度化分配猪肉桶工具的理论。
评分对美国国会组织的经验研究，检验的假说直接基于formal theories。主要洞见是，国会的委员会制度以及相关立法流程主要作用是促进分工和信息传输。主要怼了以Shepsle，Weingast和Marshall为代表的、把委员会体系当成制度化分配猪肉桶工具的理论。
评分立法机构的信息理论
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