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This volume of Ned Block's writings collects his papers on consciousness, functionalism, and representationism. A number of these papers treat the significance of the multiple realizability of mental states for the mind-body problem--a theme that has concerned Block since the 1960s. One paper on this topic considers the upshot for the mind-body problem of the possibility of a robot that is functionally like us but physically different--as is Commander Data of Star Trek's second generation. The papers on consciousness treat such conceptual issues as phenomenal versus access consciousness, Dennett's theory of consciousness, and the function of consciousness, as well as such empirical matters as "How Not to Find the Neural Correlate of Consciousness," and (in an expanded version of a paper originally in Trends in Cognitive Sciences) an argument that there are distinct neural correlates for access consciousness and phenomenal consciousness. Turning to the mind-body problem, Block defends physicalism against Max Black's argument concerning phenomenal modes of presentation. The papers on representationism consider "mental paint" as well as the "Inverted Earth" thought experiment--a world in which colors are reversed but there is a compensating reversal in the words that are used to describe them.

Consciousness, Function, and Representation, bringing together papers that have appeared primarily in journals and conference proceedings, can be regarded as Block's most complete statement of his positions on consciousness

http://mitpress.mit.edu/catalog/item/default.asp?ttype=2&tid=11054

Ned Block is Silver Professor of Philosophy and Psychology at New York University and was Chair of the Philosophy Program at MIT from 1990 to 1995. He is a coeditor of The Nature of Consciousness: Philosophical Debates (MIT Press, 1997).

Introduction: Remarks on Chauvinism and the Mind-Body Problem 1
I Functionalism 13
1 Functionalism 15
2 What Is Functionalism? 27
3 What Psychological States Are Not, with J. Fodor 45
4 Troubles with Functionalism 63
5 What Intuitions about Homunculi Do Not Show 103
II Concepts of Consciousness 109
6 Consciousness 111
7 Review of Daniel Dennett, Consciousness Explained 129
8 What Is Dennett’s Theory a Theory Of? 141
9 On a Confusion about a Function of Consciousness 159
10 How Many Concepts of Consciousness? 215
11 Biology versus Computation in the Study of Consciousness 249
12 Ridiculing Social Constructivism about Phenomenal Consciousness 269
13 Concepts of Consciousness 275
III Empirical Approaches to Consciousness 297
14 How Not to Find the Neural Correlate of Consciousness 299
15 Paradox and Cross-Purposes in Recent Work on Consciousness 311
16 Spatial Perception via Tactile Sensation 339
17 Two Neural Correlates of Consciousness 343
18 Review of Alva Noe¨, Action in Perception 363
IV Consciousness and the Mind-Body Problem 377
19 Are Absent Qualia Impossible? 379
20 The Harder Problem of Consciousness 397
21 Max Black’s Objection to Mind-Body Identity 435
V Consciousness and Representation 499
22 Qualia 501
23 Inverted Earth 511
24 Mental Paint 533
25 Sexism, Racism, Ageism, and the Nature of Consciousness 571
26 Is Experiencing Just Representing? 603
27 Bodily Sensations as an Obstacle for Representationism 611
Name Index 617
Subject Index 625
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