具体描述
The Calculus of Consent was co-authored by Buchanan with Gordon Tullock, with whom Buchanan collaborated on many books and academic enterprises throughout their careers. As Robert D. Tollison states in the foreword, “[this book] is a radical departure from the way democracies conduct their business. The Calculus is already a book for the ages.”
This classic work analyzes the political organization of a free society through the lens of the economic organization of society. The authors acknowledge their unease as economists in analyzing the political organization, but they take the risk of forging into unfamiliar territory because they believe the benefits of their perspective will bear much fruit.
As the authors state, their objective in this book is “to analyze the calculus of the rational individual when he is faced with questions of constitutional choice . . . .We examine the [choice] process extensively only with reference to the problem of decision-making rules.”
The authors describe their approach as “economic individualism.” They believe that economists have explored individual choice extensively in the market sector while social scientists have largely ignored the dynamics of individual decision-making in the dynamics of forming group action in the public sector.
Written in the early 1960s, The Calculus of Consent has become a bulwark of the public choice movement for which James M. Buchanan is so justly famous.
作者简介
James M. Buchanan is an eminent economist who won the Alfred Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences in 1986 and is considered one of the greatest scholars of liberty in the twentieth century.
目录信息
Preface xv
I. The Conceptual Framework
1. Introduction 3
2. The Individualistic Postulate 11
3. Politics and the Economic Nexus 16
4. Individual Rationality in Social Choice 31
II. The Realm of Social Choice
5. The Organization of Human Activity 43
6. A Generalized Economic Theory of Constitutions 63
7. The Rule of Unanimity 85
8. The Costs of Decision-Making 97
III. Analyses of Decision-Making Rules
9. The Structure of the Models 119
10. Simple Majority Voting 132
11. Simple Majority Voting and the Theory of Games 149
12. Majority Rule, Game Theory, and Pareto Optimality 172
13. Pareto Optimality, External Costs, and Income Redistribution 190
14. The Range and Extent of Collective Action 200
15. Qualified Majority Voting Rules, Representation, and the Interdependence of Constitutional Variables 210
16. The Bicameral Legislature 231
17. The Orthodox Model of Majority Rule 247
IV. The Economics and the Ethics of Democracy
18. Democratic Ethics and Economic Efficiency 265
19. Pressure Groups, Special Interests, and the Constitution 282
20. The Politics of the Good Society 295
Appendix 1. Marginal Notes on Reading Political Philosophy, by James M. Buchanan 305
Appendix 2. Theoretical Forerunners, by Gordon Tullock 326 Name Index 351
Subject Index 353
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读后感
作为开创性著作，本书主要是提出问题和指明方向。 p4 公共选择理论将个人的行为判断延伸到公共政策之上。 p62 考察了一些基本的概念，设立了立宪经济学的基础。 p120 对于多方讨价还价的研究很重要。 p122 （对政府的最优规模的研究，实际上是对老子的小国寡民思想的具体化和...
评分关于政治与经济决策中可能存在的相同之处的分析，在很多方面确实相当巧妙和有趣，不过，我还是要提请大家深入思考一下这一分析可能存在的弱点。在我看来，就我们所见到的这些研究作者们现阶段成果来看，这一分析似乎没有对该分析所使用的基本概念预先给出一个准确的界定。一边...
评分才开始看这本书。想问各位大侠，现在民主政治中这么多问题。怎么没有现实版的运用民主决策理论分析呢。比如经济金融理论中，各方面专家的分析。比如把公共管理思想，一般分析方法，运用到对现实新闻事件分析中去的东西。一定有，我想这本书所蕴含的思想，观点，一定有其现实的...
评分关于政治与经济决策中可能存在的相同之处的分析，在很多方面确实相当巧妙和有趣，不过，我还是要提请大家深入思考一下这一分析可能存在的弱点。在我看来，就我们所见到的这些研究作者们现阶段成果来看，这一分析似乎没有对该分析所使用的基本概念预先给出一个准确的界定。一边...
评分这本书的副标题是“立宪民主的逻辑基础”，作者在书里运用模型和数学工具（或者说经济学方法）分析了一些民主选择的模型，他的假设就像经济学中个人追求利益最大化一样，是在政治活动中追求个人效用最大化，通过个人的理性分析做出选择。 我重点想要介绍一下的是，通过这本书我...
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