Freedom and Reason pdf epub mobi txt 电子书 下载 2025
White's Professor of Moral Philosophy in the University of Oxford.
- 读哲
- 元伦理学
- 伦理学
- Hare
Concerns the apparent antinomy between freedom and reason. Rationality appears to be a restraint on freedom, whereas freedom seems to be incompatible with rationality. Rejecting rationality to preserve freedom is the mark of subjectivist/emotivist theories of ethics. Rejecting freedom to emphasize rationality belongs to the naturalist/descriptivist theories. This book aims to reconcile these positions and do away with the alleged antinomy. The argument makes three main assumptions: (1) moral judgements are prescriptive; (2) they are universalizable; (3) there are genuine logical relations between prescriptive judgements. Insofar as moral judgements are universalizable, rationality gets a foothold, and their prescriptivity is intimately related to freedom to form one's own moral judgements. The first part of the book elaborates the thesis of universalizability and the connection between this feature and the fact that moral judgements have a descriptive element in addition to being prescriptive. The second and third parts expound the beginnings of a theory of moral reasoning grounded in the logic of prescriptivity and universalizability.
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呈现了尝试解决自由-理性两难的主观主义和描述主义进路。研一下读 试着写了一篇极其浅显的书评。
评分呈现了尝试解决自由-理性两难的主观主义和描述主义进路。研一下读 试着写了一篇极其浅显的书评。
评分呈现了尝试解决自由-理性两难的主观主义和描述主义进路。研一下读 试着写了一篇极其浅显的书评。
评分呈现了尝试解决自由-理性两难的主观主义和描述主义进路。研一下读 试着写了一篇极其浅显的书评。
评分试图用语言分析的方法解决伦理学问题。
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