图书标签: 比较政治经济学 政治学 中国研究 人大研究 产权制度 中国经济 英文 经济发展
发表于2024-12-24
The Private Sector in Public Office pdf epub mobi txt 电子书 下载 2024
This book addresses the long-standing puzzle of how China's private sector manages to grow without secure property rights, and proposes a new theory of selective property rights to explain this phenomenon. Drawing on rich empirical evidence including in-depth interviews, a unique national survey of private entrepreneurs, two original national audit experiments and secondary sources, Professor Yue Hou shows that private entrepreneurs in China actively seek opportunities within formal institutions to advance their business interests. By securing seats in the local legislatures, entrepreneurs use their political capital to deter local officials from demanding bribes, ad hoc taxes, and other types of informal payments. In doing so they create a system of selective, individualized, and predictable property rights. This system of selective property rights is key to understanding the private sector growth in the absence of the rule of law.
Yue Hou is Assistant Professor in the Political Science department at the University of Pennsylvania. Her research interests include political economy and authoritarian politics, with a regional focus on China. Her work has appeared in the Journal of Politics, the Journal of Experimental Political Science, Quarterly Journal of Political Science, and Social Science Quarterly, and has been featured in the New York Times and the Boston Review. She also writes articles for Chinese media outlets including the Southern Weekly and Tencent ipress.
我其实希望这本书能有400页。
评分私营企业家如何在威权国家保护他们的私有产权呢?作者发现在中国,私营企业家可以通过进入人大政协来发射一个昂贵的信号,让低层级的官僚认为这些私营企业“背景深厚”,因而更少侵扰这些“红顶商人”。真正意义的实证检验是第五章和第六章最后的实验,作者汇报进入两会的私营企业家交更少的捐款,打着两会代表旗号去联系地方政府,也更可能得到回复。实证上,作者也承认第五章有比较强的内生性,而且也无法去除:毕竟随机分配的人大代表就不可能是昂贵的信号了,它内生于企业家讳莫如深的政商关系。我对本书最大的担忧是它的理论。作者似乎混淆了两种情况:在进入两会前已经有政治联系(这是signal model)以及进入两会后认识了官员,形成了政商网络(这不是signal model)。作者的理论是前者,但实证支持的是后者。
评分侯老师非常精彩的一本书。私营企业家用informal/formal的方式寻求进入formal制度,进而获取informal connection,最终实现对自身利益的保障。
评分我其实希望这本书能有400页。
评分私营企业家如何在威权国家保护他们的私有产权呢?作者发现在中国,私营企业家可以通过进入人大政协来发射一个昂贵的信号,让低层级的官僚认为这些私营企业“背景深厚”,因而更少侵扰这些“红顶商人”。真正意义的实证检验是第五章和第六章最后的实验,作者汇报进入两会的私营企业家交更少的捐款,打着两会代表旗号去联系地方政府,也更可能得到回复。实证上,作者也承认第五章有比较强的内生性,而且也无法去除:毕竟随机分配的人大代表就不可能是昂贵的信号了,它内生于企业家讳莫如深的政商关系。我对本书最大的担忧是它的理论。作者似乎混淆了两种情况:在进入两会前已经有政治联系(这是signal model)以及进入两会后认识了官员,形成了政商网络(这不是signal model)。作者的理论是前者,但实证支持的是后者。
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The Private Sector in Public Office pdf epub mobi txt 电子书 下载 2024