In three exemplary essays, author Peter Bornedal promotes Deconstruction as a cogent analytical method whose distinctive critical object is foundational knowledge. In this, he wants to restore Deconstruction as a rational discourse, while continuing to emphasize it as a critique of metaphysics. Two of the essays discuss the works of Paul Grice and Jurgen Habermas and their theories on language and communication. In these essays, the author demonstrates that despite the attempts of Grice and Habermas to give ontological foundations for inherent communicative rationality, their endeavors are unsuccessful. The third essay discusses John Stuart Mill's utilitarianism and argues that Mill's attempts to decide what is in principle good remain futile and incomplete. Ultimately, Bornedal argues that we cannot give metaphysical reasons for rationality or the good life. We can only decide to pursue these ideals, but there is nothing beyond the decision that makes the pursuit necessary or inherent. According to this position, Deconstruction becomes a kind of Pragmatism; or, as the author states, by way of paradox, "Analytic Deconstruction gives Pragmatism a scientific foundation."
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