The Right and the Good, a classic of twentieth-century philosophy by the great scholar Sir David Ross, is now presented in a new edition. Ross's book, originally published in 1930, is the pinnacle of ethical intuitionism, which was the dominant moral theory in British philosophy for much of the nineteenth and early twentieth century. The central concern of the book is with rightness and goodness, and their relation. Ross argues against notable rival ethical theories. The right act, he held, cannot be derived from the moral value of the motive from which it is done. Furthermore, rightness is not wholly determined by the value of the consequences of one's action, whether this value is some benefit for the agent, or some agent-neutral good. Rather, the right act is determined by a plurality of self-evident prima facie duties. Ross portrayed rightness and goodness as simple non-natural properties. Philip Stratton-Lake, a leading expert on Ross, provides a substantial new Introduction, in which he discusses the central themes of The Right and the Good and clears up some common misunderstandings. A new bibliography and index are also included, along with editorial notes which aim to clarify certain points and indicate where Ross later changed his mind on particular issues. Intuitionism is now enjoying a considerable revival, and this new edition provides the context for a proper understanding of Ross's great work.

本书主要论述的问题是“正当”与“善”以及两者之间的关系。“正当”与“善”是伦理学中的两个基本范畴，义务论强调前者，效果论强调后者，罗斯本书的目的是批判效果论，捍卫义务论。但他的义务论又区别于康德主义，后者重视道德建构和道德论证，而罗斯主张有些义务是“显见的”，只能靠我们的直觉来把握。在他看来，正确的行动并不由引起该行动的动机所具有的价值来决定，即便这种价值有利于行动者，或者是某种独立于行动者之外的善。正当的行动是由诸多显见的义务所决定的，罗斯将“正当”与“善”描绘成简单的非自然的属性。