具体描述
Updated for the first time, the classic book on why cooperation is not only natural but also the best survival strategy The Evolution of Cooperation addresses a simple yet age-old question: If living things evolve through competition, how can cooperation ever emerge? Despite the abundant evidence of cooperation all around us, there existed no purely naturalistic answer to this question until 1979, when Robert Axelrod famously ran a computer tournament featuring a standard game-theory exercise called The Prisoner's Dilemma. To everyone's surprise, the program that won the tournament, named Tit for Tat, was not only the simplest but the most "cooperative" entrant. This unexpected victory proved that cooperation--one might even say altruism--is mathematically possible and therefore needs no hidden hand or divine agent to create and sustain it. A great roadblock to the understanding of all sorts of behavior was at last removed. The updated edition includes an extensive new chapter on cooperation in cancer cells and among terrorist organizations. "This book, if read, grasped and applied, could have a profound effect." ( Wall Street Journal ) "A fascinating, provocative, and important book." (Douglas R. Hofstadter, author of Godel, Escher, Bach )
作者简介
Robert Axelrod is Professor of Political Science and Public Policy at the University of Michigan. A MacArthur Prize Fellow, he is a leading expert on game theory, artificial intelligence, evolutionary biology, mathematical modeling, and complexity theory. He lives in Ann Arbor, Michigan.
目录信息
读后感
书的内容是说，有人办了一个关于重复囚徒困境的计算机程序竞赛，结果在众多程序中，一个非常简单的名为“一报还一报”的程序获得了胜利。而它只是选择在第一步合作，自此之后就一直模仿对方的上一步行为而已。 （名词解释：囚徒困境：一种非零和博弈，举例来说，双方合作双方...
评分We are confronting various kind of social dilemmas in real life. Tension arises when individual interests conflict with collective interests, thus engendering individual rationality may lead to collective irrationality. Actually, as far back as the 17th Cen...
评分 评分什么样的合作策略是最优策略？是最善良的策略，以德抱怨？还是最聪明的策略，机关算尽？或者干脆拒绝合作，永远的背叛？ 计算机模拟的实验结果的胜出策略确是“一报还一报”，也就是所谓的人不犯我，我不犯人，人若犯我，我必犯人，在尝试了各种各样复杂聪明的策略后，计算机模...
评分欢迎关注我的博客：http://www.libinx.com 内容简介： 本书是行为领域的经典之作，主题是合作的产生和进化。作者以组织的两轮「重复囚徒困境」竞赛为研究对象，结果发现在两轮竞赛中胜出的都是最简单的策略「一报还一报」。这一策略简洁明晰，具有善良性、宽容性、可激怒性...
用户评价
从合作如何产生入手，通过建立简单的博弈模型，加以程序模拟，来说明［一报还一报］稳定的原因。挺好读的一本书，不需要任何基础知识。
评分还不错的 Game Theory introduction
评分a must-read
评分从合作如何产生入手，通过建立简单的博弈模型，加以程序模拟，来说明［一报还一报］稳定的原因。挺好读的一本书，不需要任何基础知识。
评分持续互利的关系的做法：being nice, retaliatory, forgiving, and clear. 四星给书，一星给启发。
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