Principled Agents?

Principled Agents? pdf epub mobi txt 電子書 下載2025

出版者:OUP Oxford
作者:Timothy Besley
出品人:
頁數:280
译者:
出版時間:2006-8-1
價格:GBP 60.00
裝幀:Hardcover
isbn號碼:9780199271504
叢書系列:
圖書標籤:
  • 政治經濟學
  • 經濟學
  • 政治學
  • economics
  • politics
  • 經濟
  • 比較政治
  • 民主
  • 人工智能
  • 強化學習
  • 多智能體係統
  • 博弈論
  • 決策理論
  • 理性代理
  • 機器學習
  • 規劃
  • 機器人學
  • 控製理論
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具體描述

What is good government? Why do some governments fail? How do you implement political accountability in practice? What incentives do you need to put in place to ensure that politicians and public servants act in the public interest and not their own? These questions and many more are addressed in Timothy Besley's intriguing Lindahl lectures. Economic analyses of government usually divide into two broad camps. One which emphasizes government as a force for public good that can regulate markets, distribute resources and generally work towards improving the lives of its citizens. The other sees government as driven by private interests, susceptible to those with the power to influence its decisions and failing to incentivize its officials to act for the greater public good. This book adopts a middle way between the two extremes, the Publius approach, which recognizes the potential for government to act for the public good but also accepts the fact that things often go wrong. It shares the view that there are certain institutional preconditions for effective government but then proceed to examine exactly what those preconditions are. Timothy Besley emphasises that it is not just about designing an appropriate institutional framework but also about understanding the way incentives work and the process by which the political class is selected.

著者簡介

Timothy Besley, Professor of Economics and Political Science, London School of Economics

圖書目錄

Contents
1 Competing Views of Government
The issues
This book
Background
Economic Policy Making
Political Economy
Incentives and Selection in Politics
Concluding Comments
2 The Anatomy of Government Failure
Introduction
Three Notions of Government Failure
The Basic Model
Government Failure
Democratic Political Failures
A Dynamic Model
Government Failure in the Dynamic Model
Responses to Political Failure
Concluding Comments
3 Political Agency and Accountability
Introduction
Elements of Political Agency Models
The Baseline Model
Extensions
Discussion
Concluding Comments
4 Political Agency and Public Finance
Introduction
The Model
Three Scenarios
Implications
Restraining Government
Debt and Deficits
Governments versus NGOs
Competence
Conclusions
· · · · · · (收起)

讀後感

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整體來說,一本溫吞,不太引人入勝的書。政府的作用,不該被過度的美化或期望,也不該一味的看到為己謀私所以覺得它不應該存在,更好的製度讓它更多地發揮好的作用吧。

评分

Besley的一大貢獻在於放鬆politicion完全自利的假設,允許政客具有intrinsic motivation(為人民服務的動機)因而政客存在好壞之分,把selection引入electoral accountability的研究框架。本書大緻是對此理論的一個早期介紹,並不是綜述。如果把2005 JEP文章對政治選拔的討論結閤進來就更好瞭。When thinking about political institution, always take incentive together with selection in mind. #入瞭個大坑# 2017.12.26

评分

Besley的一大貢獻在於放鬆politicion完全自利的假設,允許政客具有intrinsic motivation(為人民服務的動機)因而政客存在好壞之分,把selection引入electoral accountability的研究框架。本書大緻是對此理論的一個早期介紹,並不是綜述。如果把2005 JEP文章對政治選拔的討論結閤進來就更好瞭。When thinking about political institution, always take incentive together with selection in mind. #入瞭個大坑# 2017.12.26

评分

Besley的一大貢獻在於放鬆politicion完全自利的假設,允許政客具有intrinsic motivation(為人民服務的動機)因而政客存在好壞之分,把selection引入electoral accountability的研究框架。本書大緻是對此理論的一個早期介紹,並不是綜述。如果把2005 JEP文章對政治選拔的討論結閤進來就更好瞭。When thinking about political institution, always take incentive together with selection in mind. #入瞭個大坑# 2017.12.26

评分

整體來說,一本溫吞,不太引人入勝的書。政府的作用,不該被過度的美化或期望,也不該一味的看到為己謀私所以覺得它不應該存在,更好的製度讓它更多地發揮好的作用吧。

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