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Western philosophy has long been divided between empiricists, who argue that human understanding has its basis in experience, and rationalists, who argue that reason is the source of knowledge. A central issue in the debate is the nature of concepts, the internal representations we use to think about the world. The traditional empiricist thesis that concepts are built up from sensory input has fallen out of favor. Mainstream cognitive science tends to echo the rationalist tradition, with its emphasis on innateness. In Furnishing the Mind, Jesse Prinz attempts to swing the pendulum back toward empiricism.Prinz provides a critical survey of leading theories of concepts, including imagism, definitionism, prototype theory, exemplar theory, the theory theory, and informational atomism. He sets forth a new defense of concept empiricism that draws on philosophy, neuroscience, and psychology and introduces a new version of concept empiricism called proxytype theory. He also provides accounts of abstract concepts, intentionality, narrow content, and concept combination. In an extended discussion of innateness, he covers Noam Chomsky's arguments for the innateness of grammar, developmental psychologists' arguments for innate cognitive domains, and Jerry Fodor's argument for radical concept nativism.

Jesse J. Prinz is Associate Professor in the Department of Philosophy, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.

Acknowledgments ix
1 Desiderata on a Theory of Concepts 1
1.1 Introduction 1
1.2 Desiderata 3
1.3 Do We Need Language Desiderata? 16
1.4 Preview 22
2 Traditional Philosophical Accounts 25
2.1 Imagism 25
2.2 Definitionism 32
2.3 Conclusions 48
3 Similarity-Based Accounts 51
3.1 Prototype Theory 51
3.2 Exemplar Theory 63
3.3 Conclusions 72
4 Maximal and Minimal Accounts 75
4.1 The Theory Theory 75
4.2 Informational Atomism 89
4.3 Conclusions 100
5 Empiricism Reconsidered 103
5.1 Introduction 103
5.2 What Is Concept Empiricism? 106
5.3 Why Empiricism? 122
5.4 Conclusion 137
6 Proxytype Theory 139
6.1 From Percepts to Proxytypes 139
6.2 Publicity 152
6.3 Categorization 161
6.4 Conclusion 164
7 The Perceptual Basis 165
7.1 The Scope Trial 165
7.2 Countering Counterexamples 169
7.3 Conclusion 187
8 Overcoming Concept Nativism 189
8.1 Stances on Nativism 190
8.2 Arguments for Innateness 198
8.3 Conclusion 235
9 Intentional Content 237
9.1 Philosophical Theories of Intentionality 237
9.2 Informational Semantics 241
9.3 A Hybrid Theory 249
9.4 Conclusion 260
10 Cognitive Content 263
10.1 Narrow Approaches to Cognitive Content 263
10.2 Proxytypes and Cognitive Content 270
10.3 Nominal Content and Real Content 276
10.4 Conclusion 282
11 Combining Concepts 283
11.1 Confounded Combinations 283
11.2 Compositionality: How Much Is Enough? 286
11.3 A Three-Stage Model of Concept Combination 301
11.4 Conclusion 312
Conclusion: Back to Our Senses 313
Notes 317
References 327
Index 347
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