Social scientists teach that politicians favor groups that are organized over those that are not. Representation Through Taxation challenges this conventional wisdom. Emphasizing that there are limits to what organized interests can credibly promise in return for favorable treatment, Gehlbach shows that politicians may instead give preference to groups – organized or not – that by their nature happen to take actions that are politically valuable. Gehlbach develops this argument in the context of the postcommunist experience, focusing on the incentive of politicians to promote sectors that are naturally more tax compliant, regardless of their organization. In the former Soviet Union, tax systems were structured around familiar revenue sources, magnifying this incentive and helping to prejudice policy against new private enterprise. In Eastern Europe, in contrast, tax systems were created to cast the revenue net more widely, encouraging politicians to provide the collective goods necessary for new firms to flourish.
Honorable Mention, 2009 Davis Center Book Prize in Political and Social Studies, American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies
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經濟學的學生搶飯碗係列...08年的時候用formal model和迴歸在這個領域還是比較少見吧，講蘇聯時期的稅製差異（Corporate v. Individual）怎麼延續到解體後的，不過確實可以看齣理論部分過於簡單瞭
评分經濟學的學生搶飯碗係列...08年的時候用formal model和迴歸在這個領域還是比較少見吧，講蘇聯時期的稅製差異（Corporate v. Individual）怎麼延續到解體後的，不過確實可以看齣理論部分過於簡單瞭
评分經濟學的學生搶飯碗係列...08年的時候用formal model和迴歸在這個領域還是比較少見吧，講蘇聯時期的稅製差異（Corporate v. Individual）怎麼延續到解體後的，不過確實可以看齣理論部分過於簡單瞭
评分經濟學的學生搶飯碗係列...08年的時候用formal model和迴歸在這個領域還是比較少見吧，講蘇聯時期的稅製差異（Corporate v. Individual）怎麼延續到解體後的，不過確實可以看齣理論部分過於簡單瞭
评分經濟學的學生搶飯碗係列...08年的時候用formal model和迴歸在這個領域還是比較少見吧，講蘇聯時期的稅製差異（Corporate v. Individual）怎麼延續到解體後的，不過確實可以看齣理論部分過於簡單瞭
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