具体描述
Constitutional political economy is the theme of the papers collected in this volume. This entire area of contemporary economic thought is a legacy of James M Buchanan. In outlining the importance of this volume to the contemporary study of economics and to the work of James M Buchanan, Robert D Tollison states in his foreword, "Buchanan literally founded the field of constitutional political economy...(His) insistence on the importance of rules was an important innovation in economics, and, over the past thirty years or so, the analytical and empirical relevance of Buchanan's constitutional perspective has become apparent." The thirty-five papers represented in this volume are grouped into these major subject categories: foundational issues; the method of constitutional economics; incentives and constitutional choice; constitutional order; market order; distributional issues; fiscal and monetary constitutions; reform. For Buchanan, his work in constitutional political economy is just the first step. He is concerned with inducing economists and other scholars to take the constitutional problem seriously. As they do, says Robert D Tollison, "the face of modern economics will be changed."
作者简介
目录信息
Constitutional Economics 3
A Contractarian Perspective on Anarchy 15
The Contractarian Logic of Classical Liberalism 28
Constitutional Restrictions on the Power of Government 42
Contractarian Political Economy and Constitutional Interpretation 60
Justification of the Compound Republic: The Calculus in Retrospect 68 2.The Method of Constitutional Economics
A Contractarian Paradigm for Applying Economic Theory 79
Boundaries on Social Contract 87
Constitutional Design and Construction: An Economic Approach 101
The Use and Abuse of Contract 111 3.Incentives and Constitutional Choice
Constitutional Choice, Rational Ignorance and the Limits of Reason (Viktor J. Vanberg and James M. Buchanan) 127
How Can Constitutions Be Designed So That Politicians Who Seek to Serve ‘‘Public Interest’’ Can Survive and Prosper? 148
Interests and Theories in Constitutional Choice (Viktor Vanberg and James M. Buchanan) 155
Student Revolts, Academic Liberalism, and Constitutional Attitudes 172
A Theory of Leadership and Deference in Constitutional Construction (James M. Buchanan and Viktor Vanberg) 185
Individual Rights, Emergent Social States, and Behavioral Feasibility 201 4.Constitutional Order
Contractarianism and Democracy 215
Democracy within Constitutional Limits 225 5.Market Order
[Untitled ] 237
The Minimal Politics of Market Order 253 6.Distributional Issues
Distributional Politics and Constitutional Design 267
Political Constraints on Contractual Redistribution (James M. Buchanan and Winston C. Bush) 277
Subjective Elements in Rawlsian Contractual Agreement on Distributional Rules (James M. Buchanan and Roger L. Faith) 285 7.Fiscal and Monetary Constitutions
Procedural and Quantitative Constitutional Constraints on Fiscal Authority 307
Tax Reform in ‘‘Constitutional’’ Perspective: The Case for a Fiscal Constitution 313
The Relevance of Constitutional Strategy 330 8.Reform
The Economic Constitution and the New Deal: Lessons for Late Learners 339
Sources of Opposition to Constitutional Reform 356
Achieving Economic Reform 372
Pragmatic Reform and Constitutional Revolution (James M. Buchanan and Alberto di Pierro) 384
Lagged Implementation as an Element in Constitutional Strategy 398
Prolegomena for a Strategy of Constitutional Revolution 417
The Structure of Progress: National Constitutionalism in a Technologically Opened World Economy 428
Notes on the Liberal Constitution 439
Dismantling the Welfare State 449 Name Index 459
Subject Index 462
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读后感
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