具體描述
Philosophers have long suspected that thought and discourse about what we ought to do differ in some fundamental way from statements about what is. But the difference has proved elusive, in part because the two kinds of statement look alike. Focusing on judgments that express decisions - judgments about what is to be done, all things considered - Allan Gibbard offers a compelling argument for reconsidering, and reconfiguring, the distinctions between normative and descriptive discourse - between questions of "ought" and "is."
著者簡介
圖書目錄
I. Preliminaries
1. Introduction: A Possibility Proof
2. Intuitionism as Template: Emending Moore
II. The Thing to Do
3. Planning and Ruling Out: The "Frege-Geach" Problem
4. Judgment, Disagreement, Negation
5. Supervenience and Constitution
6. Character and Import
III. Normative Concepts
7. Ordinary Oughts: Meaning and Motivation
8. Normative Kinds: Patterns of Engagement
9. What to Say about the Thing to Do: The Expressivistic Turn and What it Gains Us
IV. Knowing What to Do
10. Explaining with Plans
11. Knowing What to Do
12. Ideal Response Concepts
13. Deep Vindication and Practical Confidence
14. Impasse and Dissent References Index
· · · · · · (收起)
1. Introduction: A Possibility Proof
2. Intuitionism as Template: Emending Moore
II. The Thing to Do
3. Planning and Ruling Out: The "Frege-Geach" Problem
4. Judgment, Disagreement, Negation
5. Supervenience and Constitution
6. Character and Import
III. Normative Concepts
7. Ordinary Oughts: Meaning and Motivation
8. Normative Kinds: Patterns of Engagement
9. What to Say about the Thing to Do: The Expressivistic Turn and What it Gains Us
IV. Knowing What to Do
10. Explaining with Plans
11. Knowing What to Do
12. Ideal Response Concepts
13. Deep Vindication and Practical Confidence
14. Impasse and Dissent References Index
· · · · · · (收起)
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