Civilian Control of the Military pdf epub mobi txt 电子书下载 2025

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Michael C. Desch is associate director of the Patterson School at the University of Kentucky.

出版者:The Johns Hopkins University Press

作者:Michael C. Desch

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页数:200

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出版时间:2001-03-01

价格:USD 22.95

装帧:Paperback

isbn号码:9780801866395

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The end of the Cold War brought widespread optimism about the future of civil-military relations. But as Michael Desch argues in this thought-provoking challenge to Harold Lasswell's famous "garrison state" thesis, the truth is that civilian authorities have not been able to exert greater control over military policies and decision making. In wartime, civil authorities cannot help but pay close attention to military matters. In times of peace, however, civilian leaders are less interested in military affairs-and therefore often surrender them to the military. Focusing on a wide range of times and places, Desch begins with a look at changes in U.S. civil-military relations since the end of the Cold War. He then turns to the former Soviet Union, explaining why it was easier for civilians to control the Soviet military than its present-day Russian successor. He examines the Hindenburg-Ludendorff dictatorship in World War I Germany, Japan during the interwar era, and France's role in the Algerian crisis. Finally, he explores the changing domestic security environment and civil-military relations in South America.

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合格的著作，提出国家内部和外部威胁对政治精英选择文人领军还是放任军政的限制。作者的假设很对，文人政府统军从来不是自然而然的结果，而文人政府对军事的控制力也并没有冷战后各界所乐观的那么强大。吊诡的是根据作者的结论，外部威胁较高而内部威胁较少的时候，文人政府反而必须放置更多精力在统军和防止军队趁机夺权上，因而战争中或战后一段时间内有一个文官统领军队体制的建立窗口。最恶劣的情况则是外部缺乏可以借以为合法性的威胁、内部又分裂的状态。

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