具體描述
How can we motivate ourselves to do what we think we ought? How can we deliberate about personal values and priorities? Bennett Helm argues that standard philosophical answers to these questions presuppose a sharp distinction between cognition and conation that undermines an adequate understanding of values and their connection to motivation and deliberation. Rejecting this distinction, Helm argues that emotions are fundamental to any account of value and motivation, and he develops a detailed alternative theory both of emotions, desires and evaluative judgements and of their rational interconnections. The result is an innovative theory of practical rationality and of how we can control not only what we do but also what we value and who we are as persons.
著者簡介
圖書目錄
1 Two problems of practical reason 1
PART I FELT EVALUATIONS 27
2 Emotions and the cognitive-conative divide 29
3 Constituting import 60
4 Varieties of import: cares, values, and preferences 99
PART II PRACTICAL REASON 123
5 Single evaluative perspective 125
6 Rational control: freedom of the will and the heart 161
7 Deliberation about value 199
8 Persons, friendship, and moral value 245
Select bibliography 253
Index 257
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