INTRODUCTION<br > SINCE 1945， AMERICAN foreign and military policies have<br > been predicated on the central theme of preserving the "national secu-<br > rity" of the United States. With the passage of time， the purported<br >. "national seeurity" interests of the United States have assumed global<br > dimensions. Both Democratic and Republican administrations have re-<br > peatedly sought， through covert or overt intervention， military solu-<br > tions to international problems that are essentially political， economic，<br > social， or cultural in origin.<br > This "national security" phobia has fueled the evolution of a perma-<br > nent war economy that has made the United States， because of its<br > superior technology， the principal force in global arms escalation， both<br > nuclear and conventional. In fiscal year 1984， the Reagan administra-<br > tion has asked for an arms budget of some $280 billion， as part of a<br > five-year (fiscal years 1982-86) military spending projection of $1.6 tril-<br > lion， which， because of cost overruns and expected suppleinental appro-<br > priations， has already been projected to reach $2.3 trillion. A recent<br > study by the Congressional Budget Ofllce indicates that， at present<br > growth/inllation rates， we may well be spending $422 billion a year on<br > tile military by 1987.<br > When he was Secretary of Defense in the Kennedy administcation，<br > Robert S. MeNamara defined deterrence as the capacity to destroy 30<br > percent of the Soviet society s population and 70 percent of its eco-<br > nomic infrastructure. He felt this objective could be achieved through<br > xvii<br >