This book challenges the view that the defeat of France in World War II was the result of a misplaced reliance on the Maginot Line. The Maginot Line was the last great gun-bearing line of subterranean forts built before World War II. Although it acquired the unjustified fame of being a white elephant, the Maginot Line fulfilled the role for which it was built, allowing the French High Command the opportunity to mass its forces and counter the German invasion. Unfortunately, the French leadership failed to make the most of its assets, with the resulting disastrous outcome. During the 1920s, the French High Command formulated a number of offensive plans to strike at Germany, but by the end of the decade, it switched to defensive plans because of a lack of manpower. Work thus began on the Maginot Line and on other fortifications such as the Mareth Line in North Africa and the heavy naval coastal defence batteries in Bizerte (Tunisia) and Toulon (France). The authors conclude that the Maginot Line offered the French High Command many opportunities from September 1939 until May 1940, and blame a failed French military doctrine for taking the initiative away from subordinates and laying the groundwork for the disastrous events of 1940 that left the French High Command paralyzed, while German forces broke through the weakly held Ardennes.
具體描述
讀後感
評分
評分
評分
評分
用戶評價
相關圖書
本站所有內容均為互聯網搜索引擎提供的公開搜索信息，本站不存儲任何數據與內容，任何內容與數據均與本站無關，如有需要請聯繫相關搜索引擎包括但不限於百度，google,bing,sogou 等
© 2025 book.quotespace.org All Rights Reserved. 小美書屋 版权所有