Jett, a former ambassador to Mozambique, examines the lessons learned when the United Nations fails or succeeds in its peacekeeping missions. He chooses the missions in Mozambique and Angola because of the countries' similar histories (both former Portuguese colonies and cold war battlegrounds) but different outcomes. When the UN closed its mission in Angola in 1999 after four years of relative peace, war began almost immediately because factions had used the interim as a time to rearm. In contrast, the five-year mission in Mozambique apparently succeeded. Jett examines the history of the UN, why it undertakes missions, and how success is determined by factors outside of its control--the conflicting parties, outside parties, regional powers, and a country's resources. Jett looks at how the size and scope of missions have changed since the end of the cold war, and how they've become increasingly complex. This is a well-researched and insightful look at a controversial activity, particularly because of recent peacekeeping failures in Bosnia and Somalia.

Jett, a former U.S. ambassador to Mozambique, assesses UN-sponsored peacekeeping since the Cold War and finds it wanting. He argues that vague objectives, inadequate forces, and bureaucratic politics converged to undercut the UN's effectiveness when confronted with civil wars of maddening complexity. Jett's analysis rests largely on a comparison between the failure in Angola and the limited success in Mozambique. This astute choice of cases--two Portuguese colonies that attained independence under similar circumstances--allows Jett to isolate shortcomings specific to the UN and explain why the Angola conflict outstripped the capabilities of UN peacekeepers. Angola's wealth of natural resources, for instance, enabled the combatants to purchase foreign arms in quantity, while superpower backing for the warring factions prolonged the conflict and inhibited negotiation. The relative absence of these factors eased a settlement in Mozambique. Jett concludes that the UN will be underused for peacekeeping in the future. Strongly recommended for academic libraries.

-James Holmes, Inst. for Foreign Policy Analysis, Cambridge, MA