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This volume presents a collection of thirty-four essays and shorter works by James M. Buchanan that represent the brilliance of his founding work on public-choice theory. The work of James M. Buchanan is perhaps most often associated with his helping to found public-choice theory. Buchanan's book-length works such as "The Calculus of Consent" or "The Reason of Rules" (Volumes 3 and 10, respectively, in Liberty Fund's "The Collected Works of James M Buchanan") are best known for their brilliant application of market behavioural models to government.But Buchanan's shorter works represented here all show originality and insight as well as clear articulation of important theoretical principles. What's more, these essays have all had a significant impact on the subsequent literature about public choice. In this volume, the works are broken down into these major categorical groupings: general approach; public choice and its critics; voters; voting models; rent seeking; regulation; public choice and public expenditures. As Robert D Tollison concludes his foreword to this volumes, "Read in conjunction with the other parts of the 'Collected Works', these papers offer the reader a fuller appreciation of the public-choice revolution and its impact and prospects."

Foreword xi
1.General Approach
An Economist ’Approach to “Scientific Politics” 3
The Public Choice Perspective 15
Toward Analysis of Closed Behavioral Systems 25
From Private Preferences to Public Philosophy: The Development of Public Choice 39
Notes on the History and Direction of Public Choice 57
Foreword to Gordon Tullock ‘s Politics of Bureaucracy 62
Notes on Politics as Process 71
2.Public Choice and Its Critics
Is Public Choice Immoral? The Case for the ‘‘Nobel’’ Lie
(Geoffrey Brennan and James M. Buchanan) 79
Foundational Concerns: A Criticism of Public Choice Theory 90
The Achievement and the Limits of Public Choice in Diagnosing
Government Failure and in Offering Bases for Constructive Reform 112
3.Voters
The Political Economy of Franchise in the Welfare State 129
Voter Choice: Evaluating Political Alternatives
(Geoffrey Brennan and James M. Buchanan) 153
Hegel on the Calculus of Voting 170
Public Choice and Ideology 173
4.Voting Models
What If There I No Majority Motion? 179
Towards a Theory of Yes-No Voting
(Roger L. Faith and James M. Buchanan,) 195
Vote Buying in a Stylized Setting
(James M. Buchanan and Dwight R .Lee) 213
Democracy and Duopoly: A Comparison of Analytical Models 227
Majoritarian Logic 239
5.Rent Seeking
Rent Seeking under External Diseconomies 251
Rent Seeking, Noncompensated Transfers, and Laws of Succession 263
The Incumbency Dilemma and Rent Extraction by Legislators
(James M. Buchanan and Roger D. Congleton ) 281
The Coase Theorem and the Theory of the State 297
Consumerism and Public Utility Regulation 316
In Defense of Advertising Cartels 333
Reform in the Rent-Seeking Society 346
6.Regulation
The Politicization of Market Failure
(James M. Buchanan and Viktor J. Vanberg ) 357
A Public Choice Approach to Public Utility Pricing 372
Cartels, Coalitions, and Constitutional Politics
(James M. Buchanan and Dwight R. Lee ) 387
Politics and Meddlesome Preferences 410
Polluters’ Profits and Political Response: Direct Controls versus Taxes
(James M. Buchanan and Gordon Tullock ) 419
7.Public Choice and Public Expenditures
Easy Budgets and Tight Money 435
Notes for an Economic Theory of Socialism 450
Tax Rates and Tax Revenues in Political Equilibrium: Some Simple Analytics
(James M. Buchanan and Dwight R. Lee ) 466
Name Index 481
Subject Index 485
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