This book’s basic argument is that the Freudian unconscious, far from constituting a radical break with the philosophy of consciousness, is merely the latest exemplar in a heritage of philosophical misunderstanding of the Cartesian cogito that interprets “I think, therefore I am” as “I represent myself, therefore I am” (in the classic interpretation of Heidegger, one of the targets of the book).

Review

“This is not only one of the best books written on psychoanalysis but also a very great work of philosophy. From a psychoanalytic point of view, Henry’s critique locks horns not only with the orthodox Freudian view but also with its Lacanian reformulation. From a philosophical point of view, Henry takes on and subverts the whole problematic of the ‘closure of representation’ and of the ‘critique of the Subject,’ topics that have entirely dominated French thought for the past twenty years.” —Jean-Marie Apostolidès,Stanford University

“The study highlights the burdensome, restrictive baggage that representational metaphysics has brought into psychoanalysis. To bring this baggage into clear view may help to steer clinicians and scholars away from pursuing pseudoproblems. . . . A related epistemological point is that if, as Henry claims to show, the key problems in psychoanalysis are conceptual rather than empirical, it is futile and foolhardy to expect empirical research programs to bring significant advances.” —Psychoanalytic Books